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Abstract
This study deals with the problem oftransitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda in
the light ofSouth African experience.
Transitional justice, a kind of justice pertinent to societies in transition from
dictatorship to democracy where the new democratic regime faces the challenge ofhow
to redress the abuses ofthe past, varies according to each case.
While South African transitional justice has taken a form of mixed memory and
punishment with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the case of Rwanda still
presents a number of difficulties. First and foremost, unlike South Africa, Rwanda is a
case of genocide and so far there is no agreement about how to think ofand understand
this genocide. Of the three different sources considered in this study, Adedeji and the
Human Rights Watch Report argue that genocide was planned in advance, while
Mamdani contends that it was a result of the failure of governmental forces to win the
war and the advancement ofthe rebels, and nothing as such was planned before.
. Besides the genocide, the continuation ofhuman rights violations and the lack ofwill
to change, the lack of democracy, the continuation of international support despite the
lack of transparency in governance, along with other elements, hold Rwanda in the pre-
transition stage. In this study, I examine the close links between transitional justice and
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I raise the question of what it would mean for
Rwanda to have a successful Truth and Reconciliation Commission; given the history of
genocide, and I discuss the failure ofthe Commission in Arusha.
For transitional justice to take place in Rwanda, every form of armed struggle must
stop so as to allow Rwandans (all conflicting parties involved) to take the genocide
seriously and face its entire truth with courage and honesty. The truth ofgenocide would
clarifY the misconception ofRwandan history and would allow Rwandans to change their
mentality and belief that ethnic majority means necessarily political majority· and to
embrace a more transethnic political identity. Then the establishment of a judiciary
system capable of dealing with the abuses of the past would be possible. This new
democratic regime, which would be democratically organized when all these
requirements are met, would determine what kind of transitional justice would be
pertinent to the Rwandan case.
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> This study explores the problem of transitional justice in post-1994 Rwanda in the light of
its success in the Republic of South Africa. It consists of four chapters.
~ The aim of the first chapter of this study is the understanding of transitional justice.
Transitional justice is a kind of justice r!.kvant to the special needs of countries in transition
from non-democratic regimes, which have perpetrated human rights violations, to democratic
regimes, where the transitional government is faced with the problem of how to redress the
wrongs of the past in order to achieve a stable democracy. This kind of justice is different
from the justice required in already stable democracies, for several reasons. These include: the
need for stabilizing elements; the need for retributive justice of some acceptable kind against
the perpetrators of crimes under the previous regime; and the need for reconciliation in order
to build a new society.
A number of models have been worked out to serve the purposes of societies in this
situation, though each country may find its own. These models are (a) amnesia1 [amnesty]; (b)
selective punishment; (c) historical clarification, that is to say, clear understanding of what
happened and why, and (d) some mixture of memory and punishment. The particulars of the
conflict will in each case determine the kind of transitional justice appropriate.
Understanding of the conflict which has occurred is the point of departure for an adequate
solution. In the case of Rwanda, the specificity of the conflict is that it is a case of genocide.
My usage of the term 'genocide' does not imply that Hutu and Tutsi differ racially, but that
they have learnt to see themselves as separate and mutually competitive groups. It follows
from this that the mass killings which have taken place have been based on group membership
and have no reference to individual merits or demerits.
The second chapter deals with Rwanda itself.
Is this possible? That people who have been engaged as enemies in a
protracted civil war and used all kinds of violence against one another
could be able to co-operate in a democratic fashion to implement and
maintain the democratic institutions ... (H.P.P. Latter 1993: 131).
I This special use of 'amnesia' is employed by Stephen A Garrett and will be further explained on p. 6
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This question of the possibility of reconciliation and co-operation in the new society after the
human rights violations, commented on by Latter, is the major debate in Rwanda today.
After the events of 1994 there, in which the most serious and widespread human rights
viSJlations occurred, the question of how to deal with those events was quickly raised and the
future of the Rwandan nation appeared to be in jeopardy. How could people coexist after the
groups to which they belonged had massacred each other's members? Was reconciliation even
possible, and if it was, on what conditions?
If we are gomg to move on and build a new kind of world
community, there must be a way in which we can deal effectively with
the sordid past. The most effective way I can think of is for the
perpetrators or their descendants to acknowledge the horror of what
happened and the descendants of the victims to respond by granting
the forgiveness they ask for, providing something that can be done,
even symbolically, to compensate for the anguish experienced, whose
consequences are still being lived through today (Archbishop
Desmond Tutu 1999: 226).
If, for Tutu, there is no future without forgiveness, is there any future without justice? Is
justice one of the requirements for forgiveness and reconciliation to take place? Given the fact
that genocide occurred in Rwanda, what are the essential pre-conditions? To answer these
questions requires an understanding of the acts of genocide, their origins and consequences,
and the impact they have had upon the Rwandan people and their neighboring countries. Once
it is clear that genocide has occurred, must be recognized, and can be understood, the next
task will be to find a model, if there is one, that might offer a solution in the case of Rwanda.
The aim of the third chapter will be to compare the Rwandan case with the South
African experience. The relative success of transition in South Africa was due in part to the
will to change that all parties, from right to left, expressed in pre-1990, pre-democratic South
Africa. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that was set up to deal with crimes
of the past was established by the new democratic regime and was found !o be an appropriate
approach to the South African case. Tutu (1999) ans! Paul van Zyl (1999) argue that the TRC
offered some measure of satisfaction to all parties. The comparison, however, of Rwanda with
South Africa presents difficulties: Rwanda is a non-democratic country, which continues to
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suffer human rights violations; as a nation, it is not willing to undertake a radical change of
attitudes in the hope of a better and sustainable future - in fact, it is not yet in a transitional
phase. The interventions of the international community by means of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are likely to be more damaging than remedial.
If Rwanda is not yet a transitional regime, what are the possibilities for transition to take
place? The exploration of these possibilities is the aim of the fourth chapter of this study.
These possibilities for positive action, among others, exist: ending the war in the region of the
Great Lakes; admitting that genocide has taken place and facing this terrible fact with honesty
and courage; changing the conception of ethnic groups and of the political arena;
differentiating between a political majority and an ethnic majority; instituting a judicial
system c·apable of dealing with the problems of the past in order to ensure the rule of law; and
devising conditions under which the different groups can coexist. These are some of the
requirements for transition to take place from the old regime to a new and less violent one. To
bring about some appropriate form of transitional justice and to apply it to the problems of the
past and the present situation will be the first task of a new democratic regime.
Would it be a good solution to dissolve the legal identities of Hutu and Tutsi into one
single identity of Banyarwanda2? Would a better solution be to recognize these differences
and hope to persuade individuals not to regard them as barriers between themselves and their
fellow-citizens? Harmony may be made from differences and not from uniformity. Is Rwanda
of post-1994 being damaged by competing groups as it was before the revolution of 1959? It
may be that the present day offers Rwandans their last opportunity to rethink the role that the
outside world may play in Rwanda.




Transitional justice is designed to address the questions of the past and to redress human
dignity, which has been degraded by dictatorship, in order to prepare a basis on which a
democratic society, which respects fundamental human rights and human dignity, may be
built. Many scholars argue that transitional justice cannot be identical to the kinds of justice
appropriate to societies in a stable democracy. (Geoffrey Robertson 199912000, Van Zyl 1999,
Garrett 2000)
They offer several reasons:
a) In a transitional regime, the elements of democracy are not yet stable, nor even, in some
cases, present. They have to be created and maintained within the mainstream of justice.
The population, often frightened by the officials and military authorities of the recent past
and distrustful of authority, has to be accustomed to the new policies which promote the
rule of law, democracy and representative government.
b) There exists a need for retributive justice against perpetrators of crimes in the past. This
need may vary or be inhibited according to the conditions in which it is formulated. As
Garrett in Models of Transitional Justice puts it, "transitional justice has to do with
situations in which a previously authoritarian regime has given way to a democratic one,
and the new democracy is faced with the problem of how to address the human rights
abuses of its predecessor" ( http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02/ ). Most of the
time the precondition on which old regimes give way to a new democratic regime is that
their representatives be granted amnesty. If this is not available to all, it is usually at least
be granted to some high-ranking leaders. Presented with this precondition, the new leaders
- willing to adhere to a democratic system - are obliged to accept, and as a result,
retributive justice is out of question. Moreover, agents of the former regime typically insist
on guarantees of immunity in return for their acceptance of a new political order (!bid).
Amnesty as a precondition was the requirement in South Africa (TRC Postamble; Van Zyl
1999: 648). It may be that members of the old authoritarian regime are principal players in
the transition to a new democracy. A new regime which incorporates members of the old
is unlikely to have a strong desire to punish, compared to that which will be present in
situations where the old regime has continued to resist change until the last possible
moment C http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02 ).
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c) .There will be a need for reconciliation in the name of healing and nation building~ "You
cannot live and thrive on hatred, on revenge." (Garrett 2000). "To address the rights of
victims and the needs of society as a whole" (Van Zyl 1999: 648) is the goal for new
democracies. While reconciliation is the greatest need in the establishment of thriving and
sustainable new democracies, there is debate as to how reconciliation can be theoretically
conceived and practically brought about. No conditions for reconciliation have been
agreed upon as everywhere effective. Some authorities believe that for an authentic
reconciliation and a new moral relationship to occur, forgiveness must first be granted.
"The process of forgiveness involves an admission on the part of the wrongdoer and an
offer of restitution, while at the same time the victim forgoes the taking of vengeance and
instead works for a restoration of relations. The ultimate goal is reconciliation and a new
moral relationship" ( http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02 ). In the case of Spain, Fernando
Rodrigo (http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/justceproject/salzburgreport.htm ) believes that an
amnesty law has proved to be a very successful means of achieving national
reconciliation. Others like Robert Goldman (Ibid) believe that instead of bringing about
reconciliation, amnesty may deeply divide civil society and discredit the rule of law. It
appears to be the case that 'Justice must be done' for reconciliation to take place.
Wrongdoers must be prosecuted and victims rehabilitated. Others have suggested that
"criminal prosecution may also preclude the reconciliation required for a democracy to
function." (http://www.idea.int/publications/democracy ) Nation-building demands
trust and partnership, which are based on reconciliation and the sense of national
responsibility.
Opinions as to how reconciliation can be achieved may not arrive at consensus. Since
it is often the case that direct retribution is impossible, Robertson (1999/2000) has argued that
the needs of transitional societies force them in the direction of truth commissions, on account
of the inherent instability in the transitional regime. Are truth commissions a solution in all
cases, or are there different solutions in different cases? As the Institute for Justice and
Reconciliation puts it "Deeply divided societies are not always divided for the same reasons.
Different types of conflict reqUIre different types of transition"
(http://www.ijr.org.za/compjust ). And Jean F~anc;ois Lyotard adds that different types of
justice are associated with different language games. (The meaning of different language
games of Lyotard will be developed further below). It is because of the variety of
circumstances in which reconciliation is desirable that different models are presented. I follow




Here the emphasis is on forgetting. An emergent democracy may make a conscious decision
not only to avoid prosecutions of past human rights offenders, but even to discourage public
discussion of such offences having taking place. ( http://www.ciaonet.org ) The private nature
of personal tragedies is emphasized. "The point here is that personal tragedies tend to remain
in the private domain and don't become the object of widespread attention in the press, the
political process, or· even the judiciary" (Ibid). A good example of this case is Spain. As
Fernando ( http://www.ksg.harvard.eduliusticeproject/salzreport.html)explains.to
liberate people from their past in order to promote reconciliation and partnership is the motive
behind the option for the Amnesia Model. A communist member of parliament in Spain said
that "amnesty must be the cornerstone of this policy of national reconciliation. How can we be
.fcapable of reconciliation after years of killing each other if we don't have the capacity to
forget our past forever?" (http://www.ciaonet.org/isalgas)
2.The Selective Punishment Model.
'\
~'In this instance, the principal political figures from the previous regime, as well as prominent
members of the security forces identified with torture and similar conduct, are subject to
formal legal action and sanction"( http://www.ciaonet.org/isa ). The example of this model is
Ethiopia. After overthrowing the Mengistu regime, the new government indicted over 3000
members of that regime for criminal acts and instituted what is sometimes described as the
"Nuremberg Trials of Africa" (Ibid.). However, Mengistu himself managed to obtain asylum
in Zimbabwe under Mugabe's protection. International human rights organizations failed to
pressure Mugabe to extradite him, and even the ANC government - itself so recently a
beneficiary of a global international human rights campaign - refused to do so when South
Africa was provided with an opportunity (Mengistu was seeking medical treatment on South
African soil) to advance the development of international law, as well as to strike a positive
blow in regard to Africa's wretched recent human rights record (Transformation 42 [2000] P
93). It is a pity that in this example, the most prominent figure was not extradited.
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3.The Historical Clarification Model.
In this model the preoccupation of the new government is "to confront and document the
abuses of the past but at the same time the identification of specific individuals responsible for
such abuses is eschewed and it follows logically, no formal legal proceedings are instituted
against those responsible for human rights violations" (http://www.cianoet. org/isa/gas02 ).
Remembering these abuses is the goal. Guatemala is taken as a good example of this model,
though the prospects for a more humane Guatemalan society seem uncertain at present (Ibid.).
This is mostly because of the degree of public apathy amongst Guatemalans, who do not seem
to see the importance of equal rights under the constitution "and in whom there is a lack of
political will to punish past human rights abuses or at least to move aggressively to establish
institutions and norms that will prevent their reoccurrence"(Ibid).
4.The Mixed Memory and Punishment Model.
South Africa seems to be the best example of this model. "In this instance, there is a
combination of truth-telling as well as (potential) prosecution of selected individuals involved
in past abuses (http://www.cia.org ). In South Africa the TRC offered immunity from
prosecution to political criminals only when they were prepared to testify frankly, and apply
for amnesty (Transformation 42[2000]); Robertson 1999,2000; TRC 1998). But this amnesty
based on truth-telling quickly becomes controversial.
"In the case of crimes against humanity [... ] it sticks in the craw to allow torturers and
assassins to walk entirely free as a reward for talking to a truth commission (Robertson 1999,
2000: 273). For some victims,
it is unacceptable that the state torturers and assassins should go scot-
free; confessions, followed by pleas of guilt and evidence against
colleagues and supervisors may earn pardons or light sentences but it
is absurd to believe that such crimes will be forgiven or that
reconciliation with the family of victims is possible (Ibid.).
Many South African victims and anti-apartheid activists would like to see the perpetrators
brought to justice and tried. In the case of Craig Williamson, Marius Schoon, anti-apartheid
activist, said: "[t]here can be no indemnity, no forgiveness, without remorse. We see no signs
of Craig being sorry. I mean, are we going to have a situation where people can qualify for
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indemnity just by saying, as if th~y were reading off a grocery list, "I killed this one and
poisoned that one and beat the shit out of the third [?]" It seems untenable to me, morally and
philosophically" (Ibid.).
Van Zyl (1999) has argued that prosecution could not have succeeded for a number of
reasons. First and foremost, with the absence of the possibility of at least selective amnesty for
past crimes, it is virtually certain that the government of President FW de Klerk would simply
have refused to proceed with the dismantling of Apartheid (http://www.ciaoneLorg/isa/gas ).
Not only was the transition negotiated between the old regime and the ANC liberation forces,
but also, even without amnesty, given the dysfunctionae nature of the South African criminal
justice system, the prosecution could not proceed (Van Zyl 1999: 651). Another reason is that
political crimes were committed by "highly skilled operatives trained in the art of concealing
their crimes and destroying evidence" (Ibid: 652). The prosecution of former state employees
would also have cost the South African government billions of rand which it could not afford.
And preparations for trial and proceedings are time-consuming. How could the criminal
justice system deal with these cases, which might take hundreds of years, along with new
crimes? (Ibid: 653) Because of the impracticability of prosecuting, though not only for this
reason, Van Zyl has argued, South Africa found it necessary to develop a more creative
approach to deal with the past: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Ibid: 653). I shall
return to the South African case in the third section of this study.
As argued earlier, a transitional regime is concerned to address the wrongs of the past,
and redress the human dignity that has been degraded, in order to prepare a basis for a stable
and democratic society. For this transition to be successful, there is a need for an
understanding of the particular conflict in its context because, although commonalties may
emerge between this and other comparable transitions, a resolution directed at this particular
conflict will be necessary. Given its specific case of genocide, can transitional justice in
Rwanda model itself on South Africa, or does it need a different one? Mahmood Mamdani
points to a crucial difference, "if Rwanda was a genocide that happened, then South Africa
was the genocide that didn't" (Mamdani 2001:185). The kind of justice required in Rwanda is
not, I shall argue, of the same nature as that required in South Africa. And what makes it
different? What is unique in the Rwandan case?
3 The dysfunctional nature expressed here by Van Zyl refers to the confusion of principles between, and the
transition from, the old to the new regime.
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The Rwandan case: Genocide
Regimes which have negotiated transition, though their situations have differed, are
nevertheless possessed of similarities. Most of the time, the transition has been from military
or civil dictatorship to a democratic regime (Robertson 1999, 2000; Van Zyl 1999). The
Rwandan case is special, not only because genocide has occurred, but also because of the
large numbers involved in that genocide: rulers, the army and civilians. It is not difficult to
dismantle a dictatorship but what follows for the whole community of civilians is more
challenging (http://www.ictr/org ).
Since Rwanda presented to the international community a scenario of 'inhumanity',
which it wished to believe was unique, intellectuals have made it a case study. Despite the
will to regard the Rwandan case as unique, there has been a search for understanding of such
'barbarism'. Surprisingly enough, a few years before the event, Catharine Newbury had done
a thorough study of the history of Rwanda and in particular of the region of Kinyaga and had
found that oppression had been, for a long period of time, a main characteristic of
relationships among Rwandan people. As time went on, this oppression grew more extensive
and more profound. This led her to call her book "Cohesion of Oppression" (1989).
In his book "When Victims Become Killers" (2001) Mamdani carried out a study of
how to understand 'genocide' in a regional sphere and found that it corresponded with a
regional crisis. In this chapter I shall consider three investigations and the verdicts at which
they arrive: one from Adebayo Adedeji (1999), another from Human Rights Watch Report
(HRWR) (1999), and the last from Mamdani (2001).
1. Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: Adedeji's version.
According to Adedeji's version, the roots of Human Rights violation in Rwanda, what
is called the 'ideology of genocide' goes back to the early associations of pastoralists and
agriculturists. The kingdom of Rwanda had its origins in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, in a small pastoral principality in the eastern part of the present country. It was
expanded to the centre, south and north by military annexations of different principalities and
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agricultural kingdoms. With the expansion of the kingdom, the pastoralists became rulers,
whilst agriculturists did not suffer oppression, for "Rwandese royalty and its entourage of
semi-nomadic pastoralists were more preoccupied with political prestige, military exploits and
cattle rustling than the control of agriculturists and their land" (Adedeji, 1999: 143). With this
social order, those who felt "the weight of political hierarchy were Tutsi of modest class who
were often subject to ubuhake, a sort of contract among pastoral people" (Ibid: 143). But also,
"Hutu of a certain rank seeking to climb the social ladder" (Ibid) were bound by ubuhake.
This system of ubuhake appears to be the first opportunity for conflicts because it created a
kind of 'patron-client' relationship which might tend towards that of 'master - slave'. The
patron was the one who had cattle, whereas the client wanted to own cattle. When a contract
was concluded among them, the person who wanted to own cattle had to serve his patron (in
tasks such as building and repairing houses and fences, caring for the livestock of his patron
and so forth). The patron in return had to protect and help his client whenever he was in need.
Unfortunately, at any time and for whatever reason, the patron had the right to take back his
cattle with all offspring because his ownership was 'ad aeternum '. But in general, pastoralist
Tutsi and agriculturalist Hutu co-existed h~moniously. But with the growth in power of the
administration which had originated in the small original kingdom and which promoted Tutsi
superiority, the harmony was marred. In the nineteenth century, with the increase in the
number of cattle, pastureland became a problem. In this situation, the "monarchy and higWy
placed Tutsi families defined and appropriated particular areas as private land, the ibikingi. In
order to gain access to that land for agriculture or pasture, the Hutu and Tutsi of middle or
lower social rank had henceforth to pay some dues." (Ibid: 145) With this appropriation by
Tutsi of ibikingi, Hutu agriculturalists became subject to uburetwa, that is, the obligation to
pay to the pastureland owner agricultural products and two days of work per week. This.
ibikingi system "profoundly modified the social relationships by giving the Tutsi notable
powerful means of pressure on the rest of the population." (Ibid: 145) When Rwanda became
a German protectorate, the Rwandan aristocracy took advantage of "German pacification to
grab more lands" (Ibid: 146) because when there were revolts against the system, German
troops suppressed them with their modern guns. This also contributed to the deterioration of
the relationships between different sections of the Rwandan community, because the
superiority of external forces intervening in favour of the aristocracy and higWy placed Tutsi
families aggravated the anger of lower class Tutsi and Hutu.
When the Belgians took over after the Germans, the Rwandan social structure also
changed, because the Belgians were intrusive. Firstly the school of Nyanza, which later
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became "Groupe Scolaire d'Astrida," was established and "became exclusively frequented by
the Tutsi. The ethnic exclusivism for the benefit of the Tutsi became a constant factor in
Belgian colonial educational policy for cadres and future chiefs and subchiefs". (Ibid: 148)
With this Belgian interventionism, the few Hutu who had till then survived in administration
were gradually excluded and replaced by Tutsi. The traditional administrative structure in
districts consisted of three chiefs: a land chief (generally a Hutu) in charge of foodstuffs and
land cultivation; a pasture chief (a Tutsi) in charge of collecting pasture products and an army
chief (a Tutsi) in charge of the pastures used by the army. The Belgian colonial government
abolished this structure by establishing one single chief and subchiefs. "In so doing, the
administration removed all the Hutu chiefs and the responsibility of subchiefs was also
granted almost exclusively to the Tutsi" (Ibid: 149). In the educational system there was
systematic anti-Hutu discrimination, and all professional training was received in Groupe
Scolaire d'Astrida, which was attended by Tutsi only. "The graduates of the school
constituted themselves into a special social elite group called the Astridians" (Ibid: 151). For
the young Hutu, the only avenue towards education was to become seminarists, but this
chance was reserved for the brilliant. The graduate seminarists were frustrated by the barrier
(lack of professional qualifications) which prevented them from accessing senior positions.
However the policy of advancement of Tutsi, supported till then by Belgian politicians and
missionaries, was abandoned in the post-World War 11 (WWII) period because new
missionaries, with different views, were appointed at the time. Up to the end of World War 11,
the missionaries had supported the Tutsi monarchy and the Tutsi of ruling class because they
were French speaking Belgians, part of traditional monarchist group in Belgium. This
francophone group had oppressed the Flemish population of Belgium until the end of WWII.
After WWII, the Flemish missionaries replaced French speakers in Rwanda. The Flemish who
constituted an oppressed majority in Belgium naturally tended to sympathize with the
oppressed majority in Rwanda.
This change of the Roman Catholic Church's position in Rwanda played a major role
III overthrowing the monarchy. On the collapse of the monarchy, political parties were
formed: PARMEHUTU (party for Hutu emancipation) and APROSOMA (that combined
moderate Hutu and Tutsi), RADER (for int~l1ectual Tutsi and Hutu), and UNAR (for
conservative Tutsi). When young Unarists (youth from UNAR) attacked Dominique
Mbonyumutwa, "one of the rare Hutu sub-chiefs and a key figure of PARMEHUTU" (Ibid:
153), the Hutu organized revenge by attacking members of the Tutsi elite. To counter-attack,
monarchists (mainly Unarists) attempted to recall military reservists, formerly attached to the
13
monarchy. The colonial administration felt it necessary to bring in troops from the Congo to
stop the conflict. Meanwhile, this led to many Tutsi taking refuge elsewhere in the country, or
even, occasionally, outside Rwanda. The eviction of Tutsi elite was becoming the major
preoccupation of the Hutu. The colonial administration further inflamed the situation by
replacing Tutsi chiefs by Hutu. "At the proclamation of independence [in 1962], the number
of Tutsi refugees registered by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees [... ] run
unto several thousands"(Ibid: 155). Soon after independence and during the first Republic
(1961 to 1973) Tutsi refugees were trying to return to their country by launching armed
attacks. The "attack which had the most disastrous consequences was launched on 21
December 1963 by a group ranging from 200 to 300 inyenzi (cockroaches, the name which
officials [of the first Republic] had given to the underground forces)" (Ibid: 156). This attack
provided an occasion for anti-Tutsi propaganda and was followed by the killing of Tutsi
inside the country. From this time a clear-cut division between two blocks, Tutsi and Hutu,
with no distinction related to the rank which individuals had occupied, was observed.
However, the Hutu did not succeed in maintaining unity among themselves throughout the
country. Those from the south and centre managed to marginalize the northerners by
practicing nepotism in the administration, leaving those from the north with one option for
advancement that of entering the anny. Finally a coup d'etat was organized and a regime in
which General Juvenal Habyalimana was president took over. According to Adedeji's view,
the Habyalimana regime had four distinct phases: first, a period of euphoria from 1973 to
1975; secondly, a period of firm political and social control with considerable economic
expansion, from 1975 to 1986; thirdly, a period of economic crisis from 1986 to 1990; and
finally a period of war (1990-1994) launched by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) followed
by a democratic regime which allowed the existence of different political parties (Ibid:
pp. 158-9).
With this new regime, a democratic opposition was permitted, and the Habyalimana
regime, with little experience in a democratic process, had to face the war launched by RPF
and the opposition. Two blocks were emerging: one, composed of Habyalimana's party,
MRND (National Revolutionary Movement for Development), CDR (Coalition for the
Defense of the Republic) a purely Hutu ethnic position and the hard-line of MRND; as well as
the rest of the "power blocks" of different parties such as MDR (Republican Democratic
Movement), and PL (Liberal Party). The second block was composed of the parties then
forming the opposition, and associated with RPF Inkotanyi ( the political wing).
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During this time, politically motivated massacres were committed by Hutu or other pro-Hutu
elements, targeting Tutsi and their relatives or the leaders of the opposition which was
composed of members of both groups. A propaganda "campaign of incitement to ethnic
hatred" (!bid: p. 161) was conducted by MRND and the media sympathetic to it. It was in this
period, specifically October 1993, that Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu Burundian president who
had been democratically elected, was assassinated. (The effects of this crime have often been
overlooked, but it was in fact a determining factor in the later disasters.) Each party was in
the process of giving military training to a considerable number of potential soldiers. Amongst
the well known were Interahamwe (those who attack together) for MRND, Impuzamugambi
(those with one objective) for CDR and Abakombozi (those who come to liberate) for PLo
With all these elements in place, one small detonator was enough to cause an explosion. When
the Rwandan "presidential plane was hit by two missiles in the neighborhood of Kigali
airport" (!bid: pp. 162-3) this detonator was found. In less than three months, about one
million people were massacred. Presidential guards, members of the army and of the different
militia (especially Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi) were guilty of genocide until RPF
stopped them by its victory.
According to this view then, the origin of human rights violations (eventually called
genocide) originated'in the injustices which occurred before the era of colonization. The first
element was ubuhake, instituted by the Tutsi elite, the burden of which was suffered by Tutsi
of lower or modest class and Hutu wanting to own some cattle. This was the beginning of the
belief in Tutsi 'superiority' in the hearts of both Tutsi and Hutu. The second element was the
institution of ibikingi by the monarchy, supported by highly placed Tutsi families. This
supplied a means of oppressing the population, and when Rwanda became a German
protectorate, the Germans preferred to maintain existing inequalities by remaining at a
distance from monarchic administration, while defending it from attack. The Tutsi belief in
their superiority was allowed to grow. The arrival of the Belgians worsened the situation
because after supporting the Tutsi elite until after WWII, a reversal of policy (as has been
explained) took place, and Hutu began to be favored. This left both groups with grievances.
It was in this post-WWII period that there began an open conflict. A further element
was the post-independence attacks. While the Tutsi oppression of the Hutu has been abolished
at Independence, the increasing attacks of Inyenzi (formerly exiled Tutsi) showed that the
danger was still there and a propaganda campaign of hatred for the (Tutsi) 'enemy' began.
The war between returning Tutsi exiles and Rwandan residents (during the first Republic
which lasted from 1963 to 1973) raised further tensions.The decline of the Habyalimana
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regime, the growing political opposition, the war with RPF - all added to the atmosphere of
hostility between the groups. The assassination of Ndadaye, a democratically elected
Burundian Hutu president in October 1993, occurred at the hands of Burundian Tutsi while
Habyalimana (in Rwanda) was trying to be more flexible and to accommodate the demands of
the opposition and RPF. This event led to questions on both sides as to whether the
Habyalimana regime could afford to be open-minded concerning RPF and its intentions. (See
Helmut Strizek, pp.41-53, in Africa International Nos 322/323, Mars/Avril 1999). The tension
amongst the Hutu, who already distrusted the Tutsi, continued to grow. The assassination of
Habyalimana, himself a Hutu, who was the 'father of the nation', caused a collapse of order,
and violations of human rights reached an appalling level
2. The Human Rights Watch Report 1999
The Human Rights Watch Report (HRWR) (1999) advances the theory that the crisis of
1994, which is referred to as 'genocide', had been planned mainly by, and under, the
Habyalimana regime. However, it recognizes that for a better understanding of the situation
we have to look at the past in order to find out why such violations could have occurred.
Like other sources, it recognizes the falsity of the official version of Rwandan history,
which claims that racial differences, historically maintained, exist between Hutu and Tutsi,
and that present-day dominance of Hutu over Tutsi is an inevitable reversal. It also recognizes
that the 'history' of Rwanda is rather a history of the Tutsi monarchist and not of Rwandan
society as a whole. But it emphasizes that the Hutu had a misconception about who the Tutsi
were, their origin and what they had done. This misconception lies not in history, but rather in
the early coexistence of Tutsi and Hutu. It is the fruit of a distorted history, written to favour
the Tutsi. In the eighteenth century, while the inhabitants of Rwanda were pastoralists and
cultivators, cattle became a 'measure of wealth'. The cattle owner was regarded a rich person,
richer than the cultivator whose wealth in agricultural products might have been greater than
that of the pastoralist. As cattle became more highly prized, they also became an object of
desire. The owner of cattle, usually a member of the Tutsi elite, took the opportunity to assert
his superiority over others who lacked cattle but wanted to own them. This was the period
when 'ubuhake', followed by 'uburetwa' was introduced. "As the Rwandan state grew in
strength and sophistication, the governing elite became more clearly defined and its members,
like powerful people in most societies, began to think of themselves as superior to ordinary
people" (HRWR 1999: Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in
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Rwanda, (http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Genol-3-09.htm#P196 82927 ).
According to the HRWR, this seems to be the first time when Rwandan society was
effectively segregated.
"Both Germans and Belgians sought to. rule Rwanda with the least cost and the most
profit" (Ibid.). Neither challenged the concept of group superiority; they preferred to
strengthen it. Since they had found Tutsi ruling Rwanda and neighbouring principalities, they
assumed that Tutsi were superior to Hutu and the rest of the population. It followed that the
Tutsi were destined to rule, as were the colonisers, who in their turn were superior to all
blacks (Ibid.). Tutsi were considered by the colonisers as closer to them than the Hutu. The
Tutsi welcomed this idea, which in fact corresponded to their own belief. This European
attitude vis-a-vis Tutsi superiority went further than supporting a belief in group superiority; it
reinforced this belief in the Tutsi mind, and the Hutu accepted this as a fact and resented it.
While Germans tended to intervene as little as possible in the administration of the
indigenous peoples, "Belgians began to alter the Rwandan state in the name of administrative
efficiency" (Ibid). In this administrative reform, Rwandan Tutsi officials were privileged and
took part. The colonizers realized however, that sometimes officials oppressed non-Tutsi
peoples, and they therefore instituted European-style courts where protests and appeals could
be heard. It was not long, however, before "judges saw themselves as defenders of the elite,
not the masses" (Ibid.). Emphasizing Tutsi superiority, Belgians decreed that Tutsi alone
should be chiefs and members of the civil service. "By assuring a Tutsi monopoly of power,
the Belgians set the stage for the future conflict in Rwanda. Such was not their intention"
(Ibid). People of both groups learned to think of Tutsi as winners and Hutu as losers.
Nonetheless, in allowing only Tutsi to be officials, Belgians faced a problem of identification.
How could they recognize the Tutsi whom they wanted to make an official? They "decided
that the most efficient procedure was simply to register everyone, noting their group
affiliation in writing once and for all" (Ibid.). The Habyalimana regime was the first to be
accused of officially registering group affiliation, since from this period it appeared on
identity cards. It is clear however that it is not Habyalimana's invention but rather a
continuation of a pre-existing situation. This identification that at first served the cause of the
Tutsi was to turn against them at the end. Another consequence of this formal, written
identification was that it created rigidity amongst groups and limited, if it did not abolish, the
possibilities of changing groups. In the past this had been possible, either by 'ennoblement'
(in the case of upward mobility) or by destitution (in the case of downward mobility).
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The first attack motivated by group-defensive feelings occurred in the revolutionary
period when "in November 1959, several Tutsi assaulted a Hutu sub-chief' (Ibid). Hutu
attacked Tutsi in revenge and Tutsi organized themselves for reprisal. Belgian military
intervention was necessary to stop the violence. The Hutu in the beginning attacked powerful
people and their relatives "leaving their ordinary neighbours in peace. They usually sought to
drive Tutsi away rather than to destroy them" (Ibid). Dming the first republic (1961-1973),
anti-Tutsi propaganda had already started and by the time the second Republic, headed by
Habyalimana, replaced it, this propaganda had reached dangerous levels. In 1975,
Habyalimana declared a one-party state, only MRND (National Revolutionary Movement for
Development) being permitted. With the strong administrative structures in prefectures, sub-
prefectures, communes, sectors and cells, he succeeded in controlling whole country. He
managed to develop an impressive infrastructure by attracting foreign aid, and in the process
took the title of 'Father of the Nation'. The country became prosperous, peaceful and through
animation (a kind of publicity) his name was well known in every corner of the country. In
the 1980s, however, his popularity lessened and a coup was unsuccessfully attempted. Seeing
the danger of losing power, Habyalimana reinforced the system of control, but the people
were growing tired of him and the opposition, though not official, was also growing. As
democratic movements became influential in surrounding Mrican countries, Habyalimana
was challenged nationally and internationally to change the political system. Finally he agreed
to allow a multiparty state. It was thought that the existence of several political parties, or
democratization as it was called, would help in solving economic problems and political
conflicts. Michael D. Lund, however, was right in his apprehensions: "[r]apid democratisation
[... ] can destabilize societies and increase the chances of violence" (Lund 1996: 36). This
democratisation coincided with an RPF attack from Uganda. When this attack occurred,
"Rwandans - Tutsi as well as Hutu - were frightened. Tutsi recalled the reprisal killings at the
time of invasions by refugee groups in the early 1960s and feared they would be targeted
again. Hutu remembered the slaughter of tens of thousands of Hutu by Tutsi in neighboring
Burundi in 1972, 1988 and in 1991" ( http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-
03.htm#P713 22987). Meanwhile, Rwanda Radio, the only Radio Station, previously
controlled by the Habyalimana regime, started to allow ideas from the opposition to be
broadcast. RPF established a Radio Station, Muhabura Radio, from 'guhabura,' meaning
'helping to find your way' especially to your home. Conservatives saw this diversity of
opinions in the media as a threat inside the country. They then decided to create another Radio
Station in response to the Muhabura Radio and the 'unfaithful Rwanda Radio'. Radio
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Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) came onto the scene. This Radio station became
popular very quickly because of its free style. There was no pre-arranged programme:
everything was spontaneous - jokes, news, songs, and commentary. People of all ages started
to like it. It nevertheless contributed to the intensification of conflict.
3. Mamdani's account
Mamdani presents us with a richer and more detailed understanding of the Rwandan drama,
drawing the elements of his account from regional as well as national conflicts. His regional
point of view helps us to understand better that the Rwandan territory alone could not produce
a drama of such significance. The crisis involved the whole community of Kinyarwanda-
speakers, resident in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of
Congo at the time. The 'genocide' according to him was not a long-planned affair but rather a
result of civil war and political crisis. Mamdani's review of Rwandan history shows that
inequalities and oppression had long characterized relationships between Rwandan people,
Hutu and Tutsi. Without the long-established separate and competing groups of Hutu and
Tutsi, the Rwandan genocide would not have happened. That is why, before any attempt is
made to think about genocide and its origins, the understanding of Hutu-Tutsi hostility and its
origins are crucial.
According to Mamdani, the "origin of violence is connected to how Hutu and Tutsi .-
were constructed as political identities by different colonial states, Hutu as indigenous and
Tutsi as alien" (Mamdani 2000: 34). Who are Hutu and who are Tutsi? There cannot be a
single answer to this question. "Not only do the identities of Hutu and Tutsi have a history,
they have also changed in the course of this history" (Ibid: 73). Mamdani sees Hutu and Tutsi
as political identities: "Hutu and Tutsi are best understood, not as market-based or cultural
identities, but as political identities reproduced first and foremost through a form of state"
(Ibid: 59). Having said this, he continues by asserting that "political identities are the
consequence of how power is organized"(Ibid: 22). The rise of the state of Rwanda in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is marked by the presence in the same nation-state of Hutu
and Tutsi. These two identities were not, in the early days, seen as mutually hostile. "A mark
of the very circumstances of the Rwandan State's birth was that it associated "Hutu
supernatural power with Tutsi military power" (Ibid: 62). "The supernatural powers were said
to be the preserve of the Abiiru [a Hutu spiritual ritual] (Ibid: 64) who set the rules of
governance, but without themselves governing" (Ibid: 63). They were advisers of the King
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and held an important role 'in the royal court. By bringing Imandwa (a Tutsi spiritual ritual)
into the royal court, the King Rujugira (1756-1765) undermined the spiritual monopoly of
Abiiru (Ibid: 64). This weakening of Hutu power culminated a century later in King
Rwabugiri's (1860-1895) statement to the Hutu that he would "demonstrate publicly how
little he cared for their ritual prescription" (Ibid.).
"While we may be able to speak of Tutsi as an ethnic identity preceding the formation
of the state of Rwanda, we certainly cannot speak of Hutu with the same historical
depth"(Ibid: 73). The Hutu identity was from the beginning trans-ethnic and was the
consequence of the formation and growth of the state of Rwanda, which eventually
incorporated different kingdoms and principalities. While Hutu, through Abiiru, were losing
their respected place in the royal court, new "patron-client relationships through which the
pastoralist [mainly Tutsi] hierarchy was organized" were formed (Ibid: 6). Then a new form
of corvee (forced labour) was imposed on the recently subjugated Hutu populations. In the
reign of Rwabugiri under which these dramatic changes happened, it was clear that "power
was increasingly defined as Tutsi [and] the political and social position of the Hutu was
progressively degraded" (ibid.). The new client relationships were made possible by the
King's seizure of land control with the power to "assign it as pasture (ibikingi) to his closest
subjects through the administrative appointment of chiefs" (Ibid: pp. 65-66). The result was
that the majority of the population was losing land to the small group around the King. More
than ever before, cattle became, with the introduction of ibikingi, an object of desire. As a
consequence ubuhake, a form of clientship that attracted all those with an interest in accessing
cattle, was possible (Ibid: 64). However with the loss of land control by Hutu agriculturalists,
ubuhake, which attracted more Tutsi than Hutu, could not suffice. Uburetwa, which gave back
to the agriculturalists access to land and which "entailed manual labour for the local chief,
performed as "payment" for occupation of the land" (Ibid: 66) was introduced.
While his regime imposed a harsh rule on the formerly semi-
autonomous Hutu and Tutsi lineages, Rwabugiri imposed
corvee-type labour obligations only on the Hutu, thereby
polarizing the social differe~ce between Hutu and Tutsi. As a
result, more than at any time in its history, the state of Rwanda
appeared as a Tutsi power under King Rwabugiri (Ibid.).
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In the pre-colonial period, Hutu and Tutsi appeared as ethnic identities with the same
ancestral land. With the colonial regime, this changed dramatically. The colonizer had found
the Tutsi in power and a subaltern Hutu. With the colonial idea that any civilization is brought
from outside, he assumed that the Tutsi (apparently the civilizers of the Hutu) were from the
outside. Hutu became under colonialism an indigenous people and Tutsi an alien civilizing
people. "Through this distinction between alien and indigenous, the Tutsi came to be defined
as a race - the Hamitic race-different from the Hutu who were constructed as indigenous
Bantu"(Ibid: 99). So the perception of the Tutsi changed from indigenous ethnicity to a
foreign race. This ideology was subscribed to in all institutions: churches, schools and
administrations. Tutsi were always privileged, the assumption being that it was their right
because of their 'superiority'. For instance "the obsession with Tutsi-focused education was
so strong that the White Fathers decided to move the school in Nyanza to Kabgayi on the
grounds that "in Nyanza there were many sons of the Hutu being recruited" (Ibid: 89). The
creation of the Groupe Scholaire d'Astrida was the crowning moment of this Tutsi-focused
system. Paradoxically, later on, those Hutu refused admission in public schools, often run by
missionaries, found that they were admitted to seminaries controlled by the Catholic Church.
Seeing himself victimized by both Tutsi and colonizer, the Hutu assumed his
inferiority to be real. The opposite was the case for Tutsi. While maintaining a Tutsi-focused
education system the "same colonial power introduced a money economy and school-based
education processes that generated new influences and new opportunities and in time gave rise
to a Hutu elite" (Ibid: 106). This frustrated Hutu group later evolved into a political counter-
elite. The official distinction between Hutu and Tutsi made by the Belgian administration was
not efficient until, after the 1933-34 official census, it was fully documented. This was a
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significant event for it formalized the Hutu-Tutsi difference and making kwihutura
(ennoblement i.e. movement from Hutu to Tutsi because of wealth) and gucupira (changing
from Tutsi to Hutu) impossible. However, this census also increased the occurrence of trans-
ethnicity for "whoever owned ten or more cows was classified as a Tutsi" (Ibid: 98).
The 1959 Revolution was a result of accumulated frustrations experienced from the
pre-colonial period through the colonial era and into its decline. Already under the rule of
King Rwabugiri, to be a Tutsi was "to be in power, near the power, or simply to be identified
with power -just as to be a Hutu was more and more to be a subject" (Ibid: 75). The colonial
powers strengthened this difference. Not only did Hutu have to pay a tax of manual labour
(corvee) or an extra-tax to redeem their labour, to the Tutsi chief, but also Tutsi oflower class
were exempted from this corvee. In order to improve their circumstances, some Hutu
21
emigrated to Uganda or Congo to find a paid job, free from forced labour and extra-taxes.
This group of emigrants, together with the pre-colonial elite and other educated youth, later
joined the political ccmnter-elite, referred to earlier, in the 1959 Revolution. "This counter-
elite put forth a programme for the Hutu to seize the power to overcome their identity as
subject people". (Ibid: 117) The idea of overcoming "subjecthood" was reinforced when
fourteen senior Tutsi notables at the King's court rejected the demand for Hutu participation
in public affairs. This group evoked the tradition of conquest: "equal rights were out of the
question 'because our Kings conquered the land of Hutu, killed their 'little' kings and thus
subjugated the Hutu: how then can they now pretend to be our brothers?'''(Ibid: 118). Not
only was the request for participation turned down but also there was an absolute refusal to
abolish 'ibikingi' (the custom of land ownership by notable Tutsi) on the grounds that it was
the "custom of the country" (Ibid.). With the external support of European clergy, the colonial
government (in this case Belgian) and the UN, a bloodless Hutu revolution took place in 1959,
followed by a referendum in 1962: it was the birth of the First Republic. This Republic did
nothing to redress the question of Hutu and Tutsi; rather it sought to destroy Tutsi power
inside the country. "For the post-revolutionary power that was the First Republic, Rwanda
was exclusively a Hutu State" (Ibid: 134). The principle invoked was that the Tutsi were a
Hamitic, alien race. It was the turn of Tutsi to face discrimination, not only in political sphere
but also in civil society.
"The Second Republic decreed that the day when the coup which began it took place,
5 July 1973, should be regarded as "a day of peace and reconciliation" (Ibid: 140). It was a
time for Tutsi to be brought back to the political fold. "When Habyalimana announced the
formation of his cabinet on June 1, 1974, it included, for the first time since 1964, a Tutsi:
Andre Katabarwa" (Ibid.). With the idea of 'ethnic reconciliation', Habyalimana's regime
sought to redress the question of Tutsi identity, redefining them as an ethnic minority rather
than an alien race. "Although the State had yet to work out a policy of reconciliation with the
Tutsi in exile, it took several concrete steps towards reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi
within Rwanda. Official vocabulary began to speak of Hutu and Tutsi as "ethnicities", no
longer as "races" (Ibid.). This was of great significance within the country, for the Tutsi felt,
for the first time since the Revolution of 1959, reintegrated. Recognized as indigenous, they
again had rights like every other Rwandan citizen. While the question of Tutsi citizenship was
addressed within Rwanda, "the failure to address the citizenship demands of 'external' Tutsi
marked the single most important failure of the Habyalimana regime" (Ibid: 17). Most of
these 'external' Tutsi were in Uganda. Though those born outside Rwanda were ready to
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make their home in the host country, the citizenship crisis in Uganda in late 1980s changed
things dramatically. Many Rwandans (Tutsi in exile) had fought alongside National
Resistance Army (NRA) and had helped Museveni (the President of Uganda) to seize power
in 1986. They had continued to be part of the Ugandan Army. When the Ugandan regime
came to redefine citizenship, foreigners from outside Africa were granted citizenship but not
those non-indigenous Africans from neighbouring countries. 'Non-indigenous' Africans -
particularly the Banyarawanda -saw themselves excluded from citizen entitlement in the
post-guerilla political order" (Ibid: 182). As non-citizens, the Banyarwanda were not entitled
to own land or other immovable goods. "An earlier parliamentary decision had called for non-
citizens to be identified and dismissed from the Army" (Ibid.).
Though Habyalimana was already established as president of Rwanda and was about
to address the problem of Rwandans in the diaspora, the citizenship crisis in Uganda
influenced the Banyarwanda within NRA to become an even stronger group since they were
already organized under leaders. They dismissed the solution offered by Habyalimana that
those who chose to remain in Uganda might do so, but returning emigrants would be
welcomed. RPF decided to cross the border, a "crossing that needs to be understood as both
an invasion of Rwanda and an armed repatriation from Uganda" (Ibid: 17). The civil war
launched by RPF "profoundly changed all those who took part in it. The Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) involved itself as an army of liberation and came out as an army of occupation.
The Habyalimana regime entered the war pledged to a policy of ethnic reconciliation and
came out of it pledged to uphold Hutu power" (Ibid: 185).
It was from this crisis of Hutu power that the extremist tendencies which led to
genocide were born (Ibid). As the war went on, Hutu and Tutsi of all classes became more
hostile to each other. Tutsi inside the country were vulnerable to attack, as they were
presumed to be collaborating with the RPF 'enemy.' "So the massacres which had ceased in
1964 - once the question of power had been firmly settled--eame back to life as the RPF
invasion once again brought the self-appointed custodians of the Hutu revolution face-to-face
with the spectre of Tutsi power" (Ibid: 192). In the land newly occupied by the RPF, Hutu
were either killed or forced to take refuge elsewhere. "Thus, liberation turned out to be a
combination of occupation [... ] of land and displacement of the people" (Ibid: 189). It was
becoming obvious that "the real aim of the RPF was not rights for all Rwandans, but power
for the Tutsi" (Ibid: 191). "This is why one needs to recognize that it was not greed -not even
hatred-but fear which was the reason why the multitude responded to the call of Hutu
Power, the closer the war came to home" (Ibid).
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The goal of the RPF was clear: they too wanted power, Tutsi power, at all costs. Inside
the country, the Hutu regime was not ready to give up. It intensified hate-propaganda against
Tutsi, claiming that once a Tutsi regime was established, the Hutu would lose everything and
ei!her be killed or subjugated again. This was confirmed by the assassination of Ndadaye, then
President of Burundi by Tutsi. The death of Ndadaye was taken as a prophetic sign that the
alternatives for Hutu were power or servitude, and there could be no power sharing between
Hutu and Tutsi (Ibid: 215)
The peace talks of Arusha (1993-4) did not stop such propaganda. The population
"heard over and over that the Tutsi were out to kill them [....]. They think they have only the
choice to kill or be killed" (Ibid: 191). Meanwhile opposition leaders were being
assassinated, either by undercover RPF in Rwanda, or as part of a genocidal policy. In order to
create an atmosphere of fear and distrust, they were accused of betraying the nation. In this
atmosphere of tension, a spark was enough to ignite the whole country. This was to occur with
Habyalimana's death. The population, together with furious presidential guards and MRND
militia, convinced that the time had come to choose between killing and being killed, carried
out massacres that became more and more organized. This was the reality; genocide was
being organized while it was taking place.
"Just as genocidaires4 were a political tendency born of civil war -and not simply one
that had marked time awaited a suitable opportunity- so were none of the instruments used
to perpetrate genocide were created for that purpose from the outset, but were turned to that in
the face of defeat in the civil war" (Ibid: 217). The genocide was widespread because it arose
from a general conviction that Tutsi power meant Hutu servitude. Mamdani points out that
two groups were participating:
1) The first [group] were victims of the RPF war and of the massacres that followed
Ndadaye's assassination in Burundi, some displaced from territories that RPF had
captured in the northeast of Rwanda and others refugees from Burundi.
2) The second were those convinced that they would certainly be victims if the Tutsi
came to power (Ibid).
The uniqueness of the Rwandan genocide lay in the fact that the majority of civilians
participated fully in the slaughter, using every means they could find.
4 'Genocidaire': this term, for which there is no equivalent in English, is applied to people who killed members
ofthe opposing group (Hutu or Tutsi) simply because of their group identity.
24
If it is the struggle for power that explains the motivation of those
who crafted the genocide, then it is a combined fear of a return to
servitude and of reprisals thereafter that energized the foot soldiers of
genocide. The irony is that-whether in the churches, hospitals, or
human rights groups, [... ]-the perpetrators of genocide saw
themselves as the true victims of an ongoing political drama, victims
of yesterday who may yet be victims again. That moral celtainty
explains the easy transition from yesterday's victims to killers the
morning after. (Ibid: 233).
Unfortunately for Hutu power, what they feared happened: RPF won. Its "victory set off a
massive exodus of Hutu from Rwanda" (Ibid: 234) to Congo and Tanzania.
In the eastern Congo, just as in Uganda, there had been large-scale immigration of Tutsi
from Rwanda since the beginning of the twentieth century, and the Kinyarwanda-speaking
community had been struggling to get citizenship which despite promises was never finally
extended to them. With the arrival of post-genocide refugees from Rwanda, the crisis grew
and tensions worsened. The Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese community was divided into
two groups: a group of North Kivu (mainly Hutu) and a group of Southern Kivu known as
Banyamulenge (mainly Tutsi). When the Banyamulenge launched the war against Mobutu,
they were joined by their fellows from Rwanda (RPF) who crossed the border for at least two
reasons:
a) The armed refugees' camps in Kivu were a threat to the security and stability of
the new regime in Kigali. For this reason, RPF was looking for any chance to evict
this major threat.
b) After seizing power in Rwanda, Tutsi (RPF) felt an obligation toward the whole
Tutsi community. They had then to come to help their brothers.
The attitude of the Tutsi soldiers, Rwandese and Banyamulenge, made them more detested,
since they were believed to be guilty of killings and torture.
"The Rwandese Tutsi [... ] seemed to have generalized their hatred of the genocidaires, first to
all Hutu and then to the 'indigenous' population in Kivu, seeing it as a willing host to armed
camps of the genocidaires" (Ibid: 260). It is in this respect that many refugees were
massacred silently, international aid teams and the governments they represented preferred to
ignore these occurrences.
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To sum up, according to Mamdani, though the genocide has its real roots in the 1959
Revolution with the establishment of Hutu Power and the exodus of Tutsi into neighbouring
countries, the rift between Tutsi and Hutu had started earlier in history. The Rwandan
kingdom was formed by the religious power of the Hutu and the military power of the Tutsi.
The Tutsi started to distance themselves from the Hutu under King Rwabugiri in nineteenth
century, when the administration became exclusively Tutsi, and to be a Tutsi meant to be in
power, near the power or to be privileged by the regime.
So far Hutu and Tutsi were both regarded as indigenous. Under colonial power, the
Hutu were regarded as the indigenous ethnic group and the Tutsi an alien civilizing race.
However, the Tutsi benefited from this understanding of their origins, for not only did the
colonial power reinforce the local structure of administration, making the rulers Tutsi and the
subjects Hutu, but its new form of administration favoured the Tutsi. Education was Tutsi-
focused, posts in administration were for Tutsi only, and only Hutu paid taxes. The eagerness
to establish an exclusively Tutsi administration motivated the colonizer to organize the census
in 1933. The consequence was that the process of 'kwihutura' (ennoblement) and 'gucupira'
(destitution) was no longer possible. Tutsi and Hutu became rigidly and permanently
classified.
The Revolution took place in 1959 when a counter-elite, formed by a small group of
educated Hutu and some wealthy Hutu from the neighbouring countries (Congo and Uganda),
became active. The Tutsi who did not want to be ruled by the new, predominantly Hutu
administration went into exile, and Hutu inside the country who worked for the revolution
became the beneficiaries. The Hutu organized themselves into oppositional political blocks as
the Tutsi in exile tried to come back by force of arms. So the question of Hutu-Tutsi
antagonism was not solved under the first Republic, for the Tutsi continued to be regarded as
a foreign race and Hutu an indigenous majority.
With the second Republic, Habyalimana introduced the policy of redefining Tutsi as
an indigenous minority rather than an alien race. While inside the country the problem of the
Tutsi was solved, Habyalimana failed to redress the question of Tutsi in exile. With the
citizenship crisis in Uganda, Tutsi in exile realized that the only solution was to come back to
their homeland. It was then that RPF crossed the border, discounting Habyalimana's efforts to
solve their problems. The RPF attack caused an immediate reversal of government policies,
especially the 'reconciling policy' of Habyalimana. In this war against RPF, Hutu power
became hard-line. And the RPF purposes shifted from liberation to the occupation of the
country. The RPF wanted power, but Hutu power-holders inside the country were unwilling to
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give up their power. Propagandists started work to mobilize the mass of the population against
the Tutsi invasion. They reminded citizens that if Tutsi came to power, there were only two
alternatives for Hutu: death or subjugation. When Habyalimana's plane was shot down on 6
th
April 1994, a detonator was found and catastrophe followed. The crisis moved, like the spread
of a disease, from Uganda through Rwanda to Congo.
When the Rwandan Army vanquished by RPF crossed the border into Congo together
with millions of civilian Rwandan refugees, the crisis of Banyamulenge (earlier Rwandan
immigrants) in the Congo, then Zaire, intensified. As a way of aiding their Tutsi brothers, the
RPF attacked Mobutu, the President of Zaire. They did this because after their victory and
seizing of power in Rwanda they felt responsible for the Tutsi community as a whole. They
also wanted to eliminate the major threat to their security, the armed camps of mainly Hutu
refugees, on the other side of the border. However, their hatred for the Hutu in general led
them to maltreat both the Hutu and the local Congolese. This widespread hatred amongst the
Tutsi-Banyamulenge and RPF-elicited comparable hatred in the Congolese community.
While the massacre of Tutsi ceased with the victory of RPF in Rwanda, the massacre of Hutu
has carried on since then, though different motives have been alleged.
Adequacy of Mamdani's account:
Mamdani's study, though rich and thorough, is not entirely satisfactory; some questions
remain unanswered.
1. In trying to trace the origin of Hutu and Tutsi, Mamdani speaks of the community of
Kinyarwanda-speakers. When was this community formed? If it was after the early period of
warfare when the state of Rwanda was being formed, this would mean that as minor kingdoms
were being annexed, their inhabitants were compelled to adopt the language of the new
authority. But it is obvious that this language community existed before the war, since some
regions which were never annexed to Rwanda are part of this Kinyarwanda-speaking
community. How then does one explain this common language? Were these communities
once closely related, before being dispersed throughout the region? If this is the case,
Mamdani's assertion, that Tutsi once existed as an ethnic entity before being transformed into
a transethnic group by intermarriage and the e'nnoblement of some wealthy Hutu, and that
Hutu also existed as a transethnic entity, made up from different annexations, is no longer
tenable. So far we do not have enough information to deny that the Hutu were in origin
transethnic, but the evidence that they are not, and never have been, an ethnic group is equally
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inadequate. If the Tutsi existed as an ethnic entity, were they alone in Rwanda? Where were
the Hutu in that time?
2.Concerning political identities: given that at least one ethnic group existed from the early
days of Rwanda, are these identities political in origin (suggesting that they were conceived
and politically polarised) or were they originally simply descriptions of lifestyles (pastoralists,
agricultralists) which have been politicised in the twentieth century?
3. Mamdani recognizes that Habyalimana and his Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana were the
last hope for 'reconciliation' and the "genocidaires" needed a solution to this crucial problem
of relations between Rwandans in order to retain control of power. This point of view is also
confusing. Mamdani recognises that both Hutu inside the country and Tutsi led by the RPF
wanted power. Now the question is, who were the genocidaires? Neither Hutu nor Tutsi
power-holders wanted power sharing or believed it was possible. Hutu believed that the death
of Ndadaye in Burundi confirmed the intention of RPF to seize power violently and at all
costs; they were determined not to give up their power. For the RPF, power sharing would
represent the failure of their struggle. Habyalimana's idea of 'reconciliation' was therefore a
threat to both sides. Were the Hutu responsible for the death of Habyalimana? He was
respected by the Rwandan Army, which in any case did not possess the missiles used to force
down his plane. Did the Tutsi, led by RPF, shoot down Habyalimana? This is more likely:
some of the ex-RPF soldiers now living in exile have given unofficial testimonies to this
effect. For the RPF, Habyalimana's assassination meant the destabilization of the situation
inside Rwanda, thus offering a good opportunity for victory. Secondly, RPF was in possession
of French missiles, bought by the Ugandan government, which were used to bring down
Habyalimana's plane. If it is true then that the Hutu are 'genocidaires' it does not follow that
they also killed Habyalimana. If they are not 'genocidaires', the 'genocidaires' must be the
Tutsi, led by the RPF, who killed Habyalimana. Did they plan to embark on a programme of
genocide themselves? Hitherto had they, as Mamdani suggests, been the victims?
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III
Rwanda Compared to South Africa
"If Rwanda was the genocide that happened, then South Africa was the genocide that ..
didn't" (Mamdani 2000: 185). To what extent can Rwanda's case be compared to South_
Africa's in its need for transitional justice? Is this comparison even possible, given that, as
Lyotard has claimed, it would demand the phronesis [understanding] of every case and that
"every phronesis is spoken differently "(Lyotard1979: 95)?
Both the Rwandan and South African societies have experienced oppression in the
past. In Rwanda, the minority (Tutsi) oppressed the majority, and this oppression of the
majority led finally to the 1959 Revolution. It was the time for the oppression of the minority.
It is this cycle of oppression, which was never brought to an end, that led to genocide in
Rwanda in 1994. In South Africa, the oppression of the majority by the minority gave place to
a negotiated democratic transitional regime. Neither large scale retaliation nor the genocide
which happened in Rwanda, where the majority was furious, occurred in South Africa. South.•
Africa has never experienced the mass slaughter which occurred in Rwanda. Nonetheless, we
can still compare apartheid in South Africa with the genocide in Rwanda because apartheid .~
was the oppression of the majority by the minority, and though it was never as extreme and as
widespread as Rwandan genocide, it endured for much longer.
In Just Gaming Lyotard tells us that there are different kinds of justice and to each
justice corresponds a specific kind of language game. A language game here means a kind of
speculative discourse, an understanding of the situation, in terms of which the problems which
confront the state and individuals may be solved. Such a 'game' allows for discussion of the
problems which have arisen, and for the implementation of the verdict arrived at. Each
language game has its own rules because language games are case-specific. Transitional
justice, for instance, is a kind of language game pertinent to a society in transition from
dictatorship to democracy. Within the framework of Just Gaming, transitional justice cannot
be the same language game as that required for societies in a stable democracy. In order to
solve the problems of a transitional society, the appropriate 'game' has particular 'rules'. Most
of the time, these 'rules' are in conflict with those appropriate to a different state of society.
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Since it is a general condition (I mean, a norm) of justice that
rights are liable to come into conflict, and since it is a general
condition (norm) of justice that different persons may negotiate these
rights in different ways, it should be expected that the Truth and
Reconciliation [Commission] be measured in terms of a coherent,
consistent, ideal of justice, against which it will surely fall short in this
or that way. (D. Herwitz, forthcoming 2003 ,_Race, Reconciliation,
Renaissance~ University of Minnesota Press)
These different rules are:
1) Democratic elements such as political parties must be stabilized to ensure political
competitiveness for democratic change. There must be movement towards a constitution
which is based on human rights, to ensure the rule of law; and a judicial system to
enforce this rule of law. This judicial system needs to be independent and impartial.
2) Some degree of retributive justice against human rights violators of the past must take
place. This need will depend however on the need for social healing.
3) Social healing coming, not from punishment but from public images of reconciliation,
must take place. This will allow citizens to re-imagine themselves as united -this is
a nation building exercise.
4) Specific spectacles of transition must be offered, within the nation, which will build the
moral capital of the new regime and gamer support.
5) Representatives of the old regime must be persuaded to accept the change which is
occurring, so that transition will not be derailed by a coup or other means (Ibid).
How should these different needs be addressed, given that they are so often in conflict?
Lyotard believes that "the question we face now is that of a plurality, the idea of a justice
that would at the same time be that of a plurality, and it would be a plurality of language
games" (Lyotard 1979: 95). Within the framework of this plurality, every case or every
language game has its own rules and the question of justice is always within the game (Ibid:
99). Because different cases of transition will have different needs, there will be different
types of transitional justice. South Africa's transition, combined with the inability of its
criminal justice system to deal successfully with those responsible for human rights
violations, made it necessary to develop a more creative approach to deal with the past: the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Van Zy11999: 653).
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Lyotard's idea is that justice is always part of the game. Both Van Zyland Tutu contend that
the TRC was an appropriate way of dealing with the past; in other words, an appropriate
'justice' within this game. In the light of Lyotard's idea of different games, why was the TRC
appropriate to South Africa? This question can be answered if, and only if, we decide how the
TRC was supposed to address the past. It is the appropriateness of the TRC's organisation and
methods to the crimes of the apartheid past that renders it effective in the South African case.
When the National Party came to power in 1948, it introduced apartheid, a political system
based on racial segregation.
Under apartheid, a small white minority monopolised political power,
which gave it access to all other kinds of power and privilege. It had
its tight control by vicious and immoral means. This white minority
used a system of 'pigmentocracy' to claim that what invested in
human beings with worth was a particular skin colour, ethnicity and
race. Since these attributes were enjoyed by only a few, the
pigmentocracy was exclusive to a limited number of all human beings
(Tutu 1999: 10).
This pigmentocracy was a driving force in all policies adopted by the South African
government. All individuals were classified according to race, with one race having the rights
that the others could not have. The black community was considered as inferior and subject to
many kinds of illtreatment. Every aspect of life was racialised and the facilities and
opportunities offered to blacks were inferior. "Dr Verwoerd [a minister in the first apartheid
government and later Prime Minister] introduced the deliberately inferior education for blacks
known as Bantu Education"(Tutu 1999: 12). 'Bantu' (black people) were intended to occupy
inferior positions in all aspects of life and always to consider whites as their masters.
According to Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, the school must equip the 'Bantu' to meet the demands
which economic life will impose on him... "What is the use of teaching a Bantu child
mathematics when it cannot use it in practice? ..Education must train and teach people in
accordance with their opportunities in life ... " (Quoted in Tutu 1999: 21) He seems to
recognise momentarily that 'Bantu' are people, however much "nonentities in the eyes of the
law, with the minimum rights of a third-class citizen" (Ibid. p 14). Apartheid succeeded in
enforcing ideas of black inferiority and even people claiming to be anti-apartheid were
unconsciously but strongly influenced by them.
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[... ] Even newspapers that might be said to be anti-apartheid, which
saw themselves as liberal, saw nothing wrong in persisting for a long
time in describing an accident, for instance, as one which 'one person
and four natives were injured'. It did not seem to occur to white
journalists and their editors that this was embarrassingly revealing of
their attitudes - deep down somewhere in their unconscious, not really
articulated except in this fashion, a black person was not a quite
person in the way a white person was (Tutu 1999: 173).
If the black community has endured all kinds of ill-treatment, perhaps the most devastating
for that community were forced removals from their land. What is dear to a traditional family
is the ancestral land. Many people decided to commit suicide because they felt that life away
from home (Tutu 1999), without ancestral land was a worthless life. Some of those who hoped
that one day they would return to their motherland died prematurely from grief. Tutu gives an
example of an old man he visited who had been removed from his home in 1960.
It was now in 1986. He [the old man] had not unpacked the cartons
and boxes into which he had stuffed his possessions. The boxes
littered the very modest accommodation. When I [Tutu] asked him
why the boxes were there, unopened, he replied that he was waiting to
return home to District Six. [... ] He later died of a broken heart, his
boxes still unopened (Ibid: 18).
The allocation of specific areas to different communities was not for purposes of residence
only, but went along with the iniquitous pass law system affecting the freedom of movement
for blacks. Whites also were not allowed to go to some areas reserved for blacks. "All black
people aged sixteen and over had to carry a pass. It was an offence not to have it on your
person when a police officer demanded to see it - it was no good saying you had left it in the
office in your jacket pocket when you went out to buy a cigarette" (Ibid: 13). Blacks had no
right to be in urban areas unless they were legally employed there; special beaches, generally
the less attractive ones, were reserved for them. The dehumanizing bitterness of the oppressor
finally infected the victim. Black people were getting more aJ;1d more involved in violations of
human rights and human dignity, either through the police service and other governmental
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bodies or through liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) or
Inkatha. Electric shocks were used in prisons and detention centres by both black and white
policemen for torture and interrogation. The 'necklace' system was used by ANC militants, a
tyre full of petrol that was put around the neck of the victim, a supposed collaborator or 'sell-
out', and then set alight. Many citizens were the victims of bomb attacks such as that which
took place in Church Street, Pretoria, on May 20 1983 in which "[t]wenty-one people were
killed and 219 injured" (Tutu 1999: 119-20) or one in Durban Beach Front in June 1986. All
these were the result of a long-endured burden of suffering. The liberation movements
organised demonstrations with other anti-apartheid groups but in some cases they reacted as
badly as their oppressors. In Tutu we read:
Those who opposed apartheid could also end up, as Bishop Peter
Storey so poignantly described it in the Winnie Madikize-Mandela
hearing, becoming like what they most abhorred. Tragically, they
themselves frequently become brutalised and descended to the same
low levels as those they were opposing. The victims often ended up
internalising the definition the top dogs had of them. They began to
wonder whether they might not perhaps be somehow as their masters
and mistresses defined them. Thus they would frequently accept that
the values of the domineering class were worth striving after. And
then through the awful demons of self-hate and self-contempt, a
hugely negative self-image took place in the centre of the victims'
being, corrosive of proper self-love and self-assurance, eating away at
their core. This is the pernicious source of the destructive internecine
strife to be found, for instance, in the African American community.
Society has conspired to fill people with self-hate, which they then
project outwards. They hate themselves and destroy themselves by
proxy when they destroy those who are like this self they have been
conditioned to hate (Ibid: 155).
In the 1980s, while the negotiations between the National Party government and the
liberation movements were unofficially underway, South African society was at the height of
its suffering. Liberation movements such as the ANC had tried to enforce their anti-apartheid
policies through armed struggle, in "particular the strategy of 'people's war' adopted by the
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ANC in the 1980s" (Janet Cherry in Transformation 42 [2000]: 21), in which civilian
casualties were regarded as inevitable. When, in relation to the Magoo's Bar bomb of 1986
preparations,
McBride [in charge of carrying out the mission] raised the possibility
of civilian casualties, he was referred to the decision taken at the 1985
ANC policy conference at Kabwe conference where it was decided
that the possibility of civilian casualties should no longer stand in the
way of executing the struggle against apartheid (!bid: 16).
South African society had become a society of victims and survivors (Tutu 1999), a society in
need of healing. At the moment when the Nationalist Party government declared its intention
to enter into negotiations with the ANC about the handover of power, it had to be recognised
that this healing was only possible through a new political policy. This led to the concept of
'transition'. The negotiators of 'transition' were victims and oppressors, trying to work out a
common future. This demanded sacrifices from both sides. Moreover, as the future depends
on the past, a promising future relies on a negotiated past, in which wrongs of the past are
dealt with adequately. According to Bishop Tutu, there were two alternative ways in which
the new democratic South Africa could deal with the past, namely the Nuremberg mode and
the National Amnesty mode. These two were discussed at length but neither of them was
opted for. The negotiators opted for a third way: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
"Our country's negotiators opted for a 'third way' that avoided the two extremes of
Nuremberg trials and the blanket amnesty (or national amnesia). This third way was the
granting of amnesty to individuals in exchange for a full disclosure relating to the crime for
which amnestywas being sought" (Tutu 1999: 33-4).
"The establishment of the TRC is best understood as an attempt to restore moral
equilibrium to the amnesty process" (Van Zyl 1999: 653). After the first democratic elections
of April 1994, Mandela's Government of National Unity instituted the TRC in 1995. "The Act
which established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission exhorted it to be 'victim friendly'
in trying to restore the human and civil dignity of the victim" (Tutu 1999: 57). It is in this
situation of being 'victim friendly' in the amnesty process that Truth and Reconciliation
Commission was mandated to care for the victims so that they might not be victimised again.
Nor should they feel abandoned or betrayed by the new regime in which they had placed all
their hopes. The commission was given a relatively brief period of two years to finish its task.
•
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Thabo Mbeki, the current president, made a plea to the commission not to leave unfinished
business in these words:
It is also important that, within its lifetime, the commission should
complete the amnesty process, to ensure that the democratic state is
not left with the responsibility of instituting criminal investigations
and the possible prosecution of people for actions that took place
during the period covered in the mandate of the TRC. ..We believe
that the TRC should conclude its work as quickly as possible so that
we do indeed let bygones be bygones and allow the nation to forgive a
past it nevertheless dare not forget. (Quoted in Tutu 1999: 79)
The Commission was given leave to examine all alleged cases of human rights violation
committed during the period from March 1, 1960 until May 10, 1994 (the date of Nelson
Mandela's inauguration as South African President) ( http://www.ciaonet.orglisa/gas02 )
These dates were indeed significant.
The date of the Sharpeville Massacre, 21 March 1960, was indeed a
watershed because significant black political organisations were
banned thereafter and thus transformed into liberation movements,
which reluctantly jettisoned non-violence and chose to engage in the
armed struggle. The end date, 10 May 1994, was also highly
significant, for that was the day we celebrated Nelson Mandela's
inauguration as President. If any event might be said to mark the
advent of the new dispensation, it was that day which demonstrated an
irrevocable break with the past of conflict, alienation and domination
of the many by the few. (Tutu 1999: 78-9)
It is clear then, for Van Zyl and Tutu, that the goal was amnesty and the TRC was to
ensure' its feasibility. Why and what kind of amnesty? Those who are against the amnesty
approach argue that it is not just to offer immunity from prosecution to a person who has
committed serious crimes, simply because s/he has confessed in front of the commission (Van
Zyl 1999, Garrett, Anthea Jeffery 2000, Robertson 199912000, Tutu 1999). Justice must be
done and wrongdoers prosecuted. And as Derrida states
no justice ... seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some
responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoints
the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or
who are already dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds
of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of
exterminations of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any
forms of totalialism (Derrida 1994 in Lenta 2000: 235-6).
However, as Van Zyl argues, this justice was not be done in the Nuremberg style.
"Nuremberg trials were possible [... ] because the Allies had militarily defeated the Nazi
regime and therefore possessed sufficient power to ensure the prosecution. Tutu explains why
the TRC was the most suitable approach to the South African case and ~ot the Nuremberg
type or National Amnesia:
After the Second World War, the Allies defeated the Nazis and their/
allies comprehensively and were thus able to impose what has been
described as 'victor's justice'. The accused had no say whatsoever in
the matter and because some of those who sat in judgment on the
accused, such as Russians, were themselves guilty of similar gross
violations [ ] the whole process left a simmering resentment in many
Germans [ ] The Germans accepted Nuremberg because they were
down and out and so the victors, as it were, could kick the vanquished
even as they lay on the ground. In South Africa neither side could
impose victor's justice because neither side won the decisive victory,
which would have enabled it to do so. (Tutu 1999: 24-5)
Van Zyl emphasises that "South African Liberation Movements did not succeeded in
removing the Apartheid government from the office by military means" (Van Zyl 1999: 649).
Needless to say, whereas the Allies could pack up and go home after Nuremberg, South
Africans had to live with one another (Tutu 1999:25). It is obvious to Tutu that "there would
have been no negotiated settlement and so no new democratic South Africa had the
negotiators on one side insisted that all perpetrators would be brought to trial" (Ibid.). Even
allowing for the possibility of a new democratic South Africa with a Nuremberg trials
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paradigm, Tutu argues that "it would have placed an intolerable burden on an already strained
judicial system" (Ibid: 27). He gives the example of the prosecutions of Eugene de Kock and
Magnus Malan.
It had taken a whole bevy of Department of Justice and Safety and
Security (police) personnel eighteen months to make a case
successfully against de Kock, and since he had been a former state
employee, the State was obliged to foot his legal bill, which came to
R5 million (nearly US $1 million)--plus the cost of the cost of the
prosecution and its bureaucracy, and an expensive witness protection
progamme. In the case of Malan and his co-accused, the prosecution
failed and the costs were astronomical, running to nearly R12 million
(US $2 million) just for the defence, which again had to be borne by
the State. In a country strapped for cash and with a whole range of
pressing priorities in education, health, housing, and other fields,
tough decisions had to be made about what the country could be
expected to afford. (Ibid: 27)
When the Nuremberg model was ruled out, some argued for a National Amnesia
[Amnesty]: "let bygones be bygones" (Ibid: 30). This general amnesty, mainly supported by
the "members of previous government and those in security forces" (Ibid.), was supposed to
be along the Chilean style "where General Augusto Pinochet and his cohorts gave themselves
amnesty as a precondition to handing over from their military junta to a civilian government"
(Ibid.). For the South African case, Tutu argues, the amnesty had not to be general but
individually applied for. He contends also that it was strongly felt that this Chilean-style
general amnesty was really amnesia, a diseased forgetfulness of the past. (See details about
amnesia model above on page 6). And as Tutu argues in quoting Santayana, "those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Ibid: 32) "The past, far from
disappearing or lying down and being quiet, is embarrassingly persistent, and will return and
haunt us unless it has been dealt with adequately. Unless we look the beast in the eye we will
find that it returns to hold us hostage" (Ibid: 31). In South Africa, the better way to go was to
know as much as possible about the past, to acknowledge it and deal with it adequately. This
was believed to be the only way to ease the future. Another telling factor for rejecting the
notion of 'National Amnesia' was that it "would have victimised the victims of apartheid a
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second time round. It would have meant denying their experience, a vital part of their
identity" (Ibid: 32). These victims were marginalised for so long, denied the right to talk and
express their feelings; they were subject to suffering in total anonymity and no one could
ac~nowledge their victimisation or offer them emotional support because no one knew what
they were going through. They were living in darkness and oblivion, in a mystery of silence,
imposed and emptied of any information. Such a denial of information to the victims or to
their surviving relatives subverted their personhood-in Tutu's words, it created a total
ambiguity in which everything was possible. It was this kind of denial that South Africa
wanted to redress by refusing amnesty. "Our nation sought to rehabilitate and affirm the
dignity and humanity of those who were cruelly silenced for so long, turned into anonymous,
marginalised victims" (Tutu 1999: 32-3). The two extreme alternatives then, the Nuremberg
paradigm and 'National Amnesia' were rejected in favour of a third path. It is because this
prima facie consciousness of the inability to prosecute, and the South African transitional
government's will to avoid a second victimisation of the victims by blanket amnesty to their
oppressors that it adopted the qualified amnesty alternative.
To be granted an amnesty, not only had the individual involved to be a member of an
acknowledged public institution [... ] or a recognized liberation group (such as the ANC) [but]
the acts in question had to have been committed in furtherance of the person's 'official' duties
and not for essentially private or arbitrary reasons (hUp://www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02/ ). S/he
also had to be willing to testify, confess and give all the details of his/her wrongdoing. This
truth-telling was aiming at redressing the dignity of the victims and healing those against
whom trespasses had been committed. As Guatemalan Bishop Juan Gerardi puts it, "knowing
the truth may be painful but it is without any doubt higWy healthy and liberating."
( http://www.caonet.org/isa/gas02/ )
Here is an example of a South African woman, Mrs. Anne-Marie MacGregor, who had
not come to terms with the fact that her son Wallace had died for she did not have all the
truth:
I was told that my son was killed a few kilometres from Oshakati [in
northern Namibia]. He was brought home wrapped in a thick, sealed
plastic bag. The instruction was that the plastic should not be opened.
The only thing I know about the state my son was in is that all his
limbs were intact. And this I heard from his uncle, who could only
establish this by running his hands over the plastic bag...
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I accepted this as a military law. You are not allowed to have the last
glimpse of your own child -even as he lay there, lifeless. On the day
of Wallace's funeral, his coffin wasn't opened. It is ten years since I
last laid eyes on my child -nine years he was laid to rest. But in this
nine years, I've been struggling to complete the process of mourning
for Wallace.
A part of me wonders if in fact it was him in that plastic bag. How can
I lay him to rest within my heart, if I didn't see him go? When I lost
my mother, whom I loved very much, I saw her, I touched her and
therefore I was able to separate from her, release her and move on. But
with Wallace, there are so many questions that are still unanswered.
In my struggle with my grief, I would like to know where exactly he
died. How it happened. Who was there with him when it happened?
Did anybody help him to prevent it from happening? Who was the
doctor who attended to him? I've never had the opportunity to ask
these questions. Nobody has ever explained anything to me about my
son's death ...
I sometimes see Wallace in streets. I remember two distinct occasions,
when I thought I was seeing him. And it turned out to be somebody
who looked like him. My grief becomes more intense on the
anniversaries of my son's death and on his birthday. He would have
turned thirty in January. I've kept an album of all his photographs, as a
way of dealing with the many feeling I have about the loss. But it is
very hard, when there are so many things you are not sure about. (Tutu
1999: 148)
When the TRC was able to arrange a meetin~tween the MacGregor family and someone
who knew about their son's death,
Mrs. Anne-Marie MacGregor kept repeating under her breath 'By is
rerig dood' ('he is really dead'). Once this fact had been established
beyond doubt for her, she seemed to be able to come to terms with its
trauma and starkness, and to experience closure. She would no longer
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suffer the torture of hoping against futile hope that the army had made
a mistake and that her son was still alive. (Ibid: 149)
It was only when the truth was known and responsibility assumed that reconciliation
could be thought of. "Reconciliation, like justice, is predicted on personal responsibility and
transcends what is real and knowable" (Lenta 2000: 235). When in October 1993 the Chilean
government decided to solve the situation of women whose husbands had disappeared, one of
them, Isabelle Letellier, wrote "The price of life". The text is as follows.
And now they want to kill him by decree. I was supposed to start the
process for being declared widow and stop wondering, looking around
desperately through the streets, showing his photo to every passerby.
Like if he was dead in a remote war, they are advising me to apply for
pension. They are advising me to ask for money to buy notebooks for
my children. That is what they want: that I put aside his photo calmly
beside my parents', that I go out to buy milk, everyday, with the
penSIOn money.
But they do not seem to understand. Of course I would like to put his
photo aside, calmly. Of course that I want to do it and I will. And one
cannot say that we have more than enough notebooks in this house or
too much food at every meal. But there is something else that has to be
done before putting his photo aside. I do not know if they can
understand it.
It is not unimaginable, it is even something normal enough: I simply
want to see the face of the man, the man who killed him. Not for
vengeance, I do not have the desire for vengeance. No, it will be
enough for me to see the face of that man who bought the bullets with
which he was shot. It is so simple after all, even a child can understand
it. And the notebooks, for no more doubts, the notebooks, it is I who
will buy them. This is what I want to tell that man, that man who
killed him.
It is not he who will buy milk for my children. It is not he who will
buy milk for my children. I want to tell him that, and I want him to try
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to understand, in looking into my eyes, face to face, and I, posing my
eyes upon his face. Calmly. Upon the face of the man who killed him.
(Translated from French version found on
http://www.aibf.be/nov/2000/pardon.html).
The case of the Chilean government is an example of the incapacity to prosecute and
the option for amnesty in Latin America, though Letellier's example shows that reconciliation
must not be based on forgetfulness but on knowledge and responsibility. However, does this
bereaved wife want to see the man who killed her husband in order to forgive him or just to
tell him that no matter what happened she will never depend on the killer, she will always
manage her household, that she will take up both her responsibilities and her husband's? Is the
knowledge of the truth always necessary? Does it always lead to reconciliation?
According to Robertson, "[W] hat the history of 'transitional justice' -or the lack of
it-in Latin America demonstrates in the longer term is that the emergence of any measure of
truth is not a basis for reconciliation" (Robertson 199912000: 271). This was also the~
that the South African TRC faced, Knowing the truth does not necessarily lead to
reconciliation. What follows knowledge of the truth? Do we forgive and forget? Do we
forgive but not forget; meaning that though engaged in the relationship with the ex-
wrongdoer, we still refer to the past occasionally? Do we forget but not forgive? Do we seek
for legal retribution? Do we seek for revenge in whatever way we can? It is because of these
unresolved questions that not everyone welcomed the TRC.
As I have said above, those who opposed the amnesty process believed that it
promoted a culture of impunity and encouraged belief that one can get away with all one's
wrongdoing simply by being granted amnesty. But Tutu argues that rather than promoting the
culture of impunity, the process rather encouraged accountability.
It is also not true that the granting of amnesty encourages
impunity in the sense that perpetrators can escape completely the
consequences of their actions, because amnesty is granted only to
those who plead guilty, and who accept responsibility for what they
have done. Amnesty is not given to innocent people or to those who
claim to be innocent. Thus the process in fact encourages
accountability rather than the opposite. It supports the new culture of
respect for human rights and acknowledgement of responsibility and
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accountability by which the new democracy wishes to be
characterized. (!bid: 51)
It is also very important to note that
retributive justice [... ] is not the only form of justice. I [Tutu] contend /
that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which was
characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central
concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of Ubuntu,
the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration
of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both
the victim and the perpetrator who should be given the opportunity to
be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her
offence. (!bid: 51-2)
Could there be an alternative more appropriate to the South African case? Given the nature of
this case, Van Zyl and Tutu believe that the TRC was the appropriate approach because
prosecution was unlikely to be helpful. Drawing on the TRC experience, [Van Zyl] argues
that new democracies emerging from periods of massive and/or systematic violations of
human rights are unable, for a combination of practical and political reasons, to prosecute
more than a tiny percentage of those responsible for human rights abuse (Van Zyl 1999 648).
As I have said above, if the ANC had insisted on the prosecution of all human rights
violators, not only would the government of FW de Klerk have refused to dismantle Apartheid
and allow the African National Congress to come into power
( http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas07/ ), but also the South African Criminal Justice system was
dysfunctional in regard to human rights violations (Van Zyl 1999). Moreover, even if the
South African Criminal Justice system were efficient, the prosecution would have cost more
than the State could afford given that the majority of crimes were committed by former State
employees and as a result the State would have to pay for all the proceedings and trials. The
prosecutions would also have been complicated in their proceedings and gathering of
information and evidence by the fact that the offenders were highly trained in the art of
destroying evidence and concealing their crimes (van Zyl 1999).
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Not only was the destruction of evidence carried out immediately after the crimes were
committed, but also, as Verne Harris in Transformation 42 (2000) argues, tons of documents
and archives were destroyed by the Apartheid government before they left their offices to the
new democratic government. This was to shape its policy of "forgetfulness, of state-imposed
amnesia" (Transformation 42: 29).
Under apartheid the terrain of social memory, as with all social space,
was a site of struggle. In the crudest sense, this was a struggle of
remembering against forgetting, of oppositional memory fighting a
life-and-death struggle against a systematic forgetting engineered by
the state [... ]. The state generated huge information resources, which
it secreted jealously from the public view. It routinely destroyed public
records in order to keep certain processes secret. [... ] And [... ] the
tools of forgetfulness were also important to the transfer of power -
between 1990-94 the state engaged in a large-scale sanitisation of its
memory resources designed to keep certain information out of the
hands of a future democratic government. (!bid: 29-30)
This systematic and general destruction of information constituted a major problem for the
finding of evidence for making a case. Needless to say, it takes time for preparations and
proceedings of trials. Given the numbers of past offenders and the number of current
offenders also waiting for trail, the South African judiciary system could not even deal with a
tiny percentage; the majority would die without trial. It will not be helpful for the offender
because without trial, he or she is neither guilty nor innocent. He or she dies a suspect and this
is not the goal of the judicial or correctional system. It is not helpful for the judicial system
either, because these delays might lead people to lose trust in the system and they would look
for another alternative, such as 'people's justice'. It is not helpful for the prisons, for the large
number of prisoners awaiting trial would become a burden for the whole society and prisons
would risk overcrowding. The result of this overcrowding may be disastrous.
Rwanda
To different types of game, different types of justice, Lyotard would say. To the South
African transition, the TRC was an appropriate tool of justice. What could it be for Rwanda?
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If transitional justice in South Africa has succeeded, it is because both parties, the Apartheid
regime and liberation movements were willing to collaborate and to change (Van Zyl 1999,
Cherry in Transformation 42[2 000], Robertson 1999,2000). In Rwanda, there seems to be no
similar will to change from dictatorship to democracy. Both the previous and the present
regimes, though different, are preoccupied with holding on to power at all costs. Whereas in
South Africa, the Apartheid and liberation movements negotiated a transitional government,
the present regime in Rwanda has overthrown its predecessor by military means. After seizing
power, the Rwandan Patriotic Front regime was and still is preoccupied by the survival of its
'rescapes' (survivors of the genocide) and 'proteges' ('protected' from being harmed or
victim of new slaughter) rather than pursuing the common good and the interests of the
Rwandan people at large. They seem convinced that the survival of the Rwandan people
depends on victory in an armed struggle rather than democracy. It is because its first
consideration is the survival of Tutsi community at large that RPF regime is perpetuating the
internal circle of war in the region of the Great Lakes (Mamdani 2001).
When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) backed the Banyamulenge in their fight
against Mobutu in 1996, one journalist observed: "war is the modus operandi of RPF. Look
yourself! They started in Uganda in backing Museveni and helping him to seize the power and
then they came to Rwanda to have the power for themselves and they have got it. Now they
want Zaire and they will have it." Later, this claim was revealed as prophetic, though at the
time it was very hard to imagine a big country like Zaire falling into the rebels' hands after
only a few months of fighting.
If the 1990 RPF invasion of Rwanda from Uganda arose from
the citizenship crisis on both sides of the Uganda-Rwanda border,
the RPF invasion of Congo in 1997 needs to be understood as the
outcome of similar influences, except that this time their attacks were
an attempt to intervene in the conflicts on the Rwanda and the Congo
sides ofthe border (Mamdani 2000: 234).
As was mentioned above, when refugees crossed the border in 1994, a crisis arising from the
refusal of citizenship to Rwandan settlers was already in existence in Kivu, eastern Zaire. The
refugees, mixed with many armed militia and members of the vanquished Forces Armees
Rwandaises (these troops had served the Habyalimana regime and are known as FAR), further
increased tensions. Tutsi from the Congo saw themselves driven· to Rwanda by both
'indigenous' Congolese and the new refugees. As Mamdani says, "the situation in North Kivu
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reached a climax between March and May 1996, when the remaining Tutsi from Masisi and
Rutchuru were identified and taken to the border. They were chased out, not killed" (Ibid:
255). The driving of Congolese Tutsi back to Rwanda was justified, the 'indigenous'
Copgolese believed, by their attitude.
The threat of being declared non-citizens by the 1991 Mission
d'Identification de Zairois au Kivu had increased the cross-border
movement of the young Congolese Tutsi going to join the RPF for
military training. This movement lent credibility to the notion spread
by some "indigenous" organisations, including Maghrivi, that the
Congolese Tutsi were really Rwandese. (Ibid.)
Although the links already existed, it was "under pressure from armed Hutu in the camps and
from soldiers of the Congolese Army, [that] the Banyamulenge began to forge [official] links
with RPF to acquire arms" (Ibid: 256). This attitude increased the antagonism between Tutsi
and Hutu in Kivu, and Tutsi were threatened by refugee Hutu. "In response, the RPF trained
and armed Congolese Tutsi" (Ibid). During the first rebellion, when the Banyamulenge
launched the war against the Mobutu regime 'to vindicate their rights', they were quickly
joined by RPF for at least two reasons: (1) in order to destroy the armed camps on the border,
seen as a threat to the security of the new regime in Kigali, and (2) because after winning the
war in Rwanda the RPF felt responsible for the survival of all Tutsi in general. This feeling
responsible for all Tutsi is one of the characteristics that Mamdani gives toa diasporic state.
The diasporic nature of Tutsi people is in part the result of the genocide in Rwanda.
Two beliefs arise from the diasporic character of postgenocide Tutsi power in Rwanda. The
first is an overwhelming sense of moral responsibility for the very survival of all remaining
Tutsi, wherever they may be. The result is that postgenocide power is defined by a diasporic,
rather than a territorial, notion of political obligation and political community. The second -
also a direct outcome of the experience of genocide-is the conviction that supreme power in
the state is a condition of Tutsi survival (Mamdani 2000: 261).
It is this last conviction that led the RPF to impose its policies on the new government
of Laurent Desire Kabila in Kinshasa. The prophecies of the journalist mentioned earlier have
been proven well founded: RPF achieved a measure of power in Kinshasa. However, if Kabila
accepted RPF policies, at least for a while, it was in order to get help because he knew that he
had no army and no means of controling or expelling RPF. That is why, later, when he felt
more or less secure in Kinshasa, he decided, to the surprise of the international community, to
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expel the Rwandans and force them to return to their country. Some analysts believe that
Kabila did to the Rwandans what they wished to do to him: to overthrow him. The Rwandans
expelled by Kabila included the Banyamulenge and members of the RPF. The Banyamulenge,
long-term residents in the Congo, found that Kabila's new regime which they had helped to
establish was unwilling to give them citizenship. The RPF refused to give up the benefits it
was enjoying from the new power in Kinshasa. Under Kabila's government, Kigali had
become an economic centre for the region, since all imports and exports in the region came
via Kigali. These were reasons enough for these groups to join together to launch the Second
Rebellion (1998), against the government of Kabila.
if it was the refusal of Ugandan citizenship to the Banyarwanda in Uganda that created
the immediate motivation for the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990, it was a similar threat to
the Banyamulenge in the Congo that influenced Rwanda to support the Second Rebellion, this
time against the government of Kabila (!bid: 258). In my opinion, Mamdani is forgetting that
the Banyamulenge were not only in the Army but also members of government and civil
officials. When Kabila formed a new Congolese army, there was controversy concerning who
was to be included, and most importantly, who was to take the command. Though Kabila was
President, his Minister of Foreign Affairs was Dr. Bizima Karaha, a Rwandan, and people
from Rwanda held several other high offices. This had a big impact on decision making and
Kabila always felt that if the army was dominated by Rwandans, it would be a threat to him.
His first tactic, perhaps also his first strategic error, was to recognise and officially
denounce the killings of thousands of Hutu refugees in Eastern Congo by RPF soldiers. RPF
was not only fighting on his side against Mobutu but also was busy hunting all refugee Hutu
and killing them. At the time of Kabila's announcement, the Rwandan government had always
denied any involvement in the Congolese crisis. According to the Rwandan government, the
Congolese crisis was an internal crisis and no foreign forces were involved. But a little earlier,
Kabila had denied any Congolese involvement in the killings of Hutu refugees or Congolese,
and even refused international investigations concerning human rights in the Congo under his
government.
The First Rebellion (1996) led to indiscriminate slaughter of Interahamwe (a Hutu
military group), of unarmed Hutu refugees, of the Hutu in Maghrivi in northern Kivu, and
other Hutu elsewhere. Those responsible for the slaughter became part of the Kabila
government and were part of the forces that opposed a UN inquiry into the matter. Those who
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carried out these massacres of Hutu in Kivu are today a part of military forces of the Second
Rebellion (Mamdani 2000: 260).
How could Kabila have protected refugees when the first person to be concerned
about the refugee question, Sadako Ogatta, the representative of United Nations High
Commission for Refugees, in her visit to Eastern Congo in 1997, had denied the presence of
refugees in the region? Maybe this denial meant that all refugees had been killed or forced to
go back to Rwanda, where death was waiting for them. Amnesty International reported in
1997 about Rwanda:
Refugees forcibly repatriated from surrounding countries have been
among the victims. Some have been killed, others have "disappeared".
The government has denied access to others, such as scores of
refugees forcibly repatriated from Gabon on 12 August, who are still




If the First Rebellion cost many lives, refugees and Congolese as well, the Second
Rebellion attempted to kill all of the Interahamwe. Some Interahamwe nevertheless remain in
the Congo and are likely to be there until the conflict is over. But every refugee was ipso
facto regarded as Interahamwe. The term 'refugee' here includes every person who fled the
Kigali regime, Hutu or Tutsi, and who is seen as an enemy to the current government.
According to the RPF policy, an enemy is no longer an enemy when he is no longer alive. The
moral difference between the RPF government and the 'genocidal' government it replaced is
difficult to establish, for both wanted and want to eliminate their enemies.
The Second Rebellion in turn evoked from the Kabila government an exhortation to
the 'indigenous' (i.e. non-Hutu and non-Tutsi) population in Kivu to slaughter
indiscriminately not only invading forces from Rwanda, but also the Congolese
Banyamulenge in the rebellion and even all Congolese Tutsi civilians. Rwanda armed the
Congolese Tutsi in order to make them more effective fighters in the Second Rebellion; the
Kabila government armed Hutu as a countermeasure. Rwandans and Tutsi on one side and
Congolese and Hutu on the other seemed determined to liquidate each other. (Mamdani 2000:
260-1)
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Donald W. Shriver Jr. asks, in An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics (1995), when
combatants will learn that there is no greater gain than to convince your enemy without
wanting to destroy him. To demonstrate that one can confront and oppose enemies without
attempting to annihilate them is a political gain in any civil culture. To educate the enemy in
the justice of one's cause and to persuade that enemy to consent to that justice is a still greater
gain. In that gain a certain forgiveness comes to birth along with beginnings of new social
covenants (Shriver 1995: 199-200).
In this slaughter by both sides under the Kabila government in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), the Congolese were subjected to the same ill-treatment. In 1994,
Rwanda lost nearly a million lives (though statistics differ in different sources); the war in the
eastern DRC doubled the loss. "It is estimated that 2.5 million people have died in the eastern
DRC from war-related causes in the last four years. Since August 1998, Rwandese
government forces have occupied most of this part of the DRC, an area equivalent to 16 times
the size of Rwanda itself'. (http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsfJ
How can the Rwandan government justify this behaviour in another sovereign state?
Can even the security of one's own country be a good enough reason to invade another
country, thereby violating the other's sovereignty? Amnesty International published a report
in 2001: "Rwandese-controlled eastern DRC: Devastating human toll" in which we read:
the killing of thousands of Congolese civilians trapped in the middle./
of this destructive fighting cannot be justified by the Rwandese
Government and allied Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Democratie-Goma (RCD-Goma) authorities on the basis of security
threats to Rwanda's borders" Not only killings but also "arbitrary
arrests and unlawful detention are also a constant practice in the areas
controlled by the Rwandese army and RCD-Goma forces. In many
cases, arrests of people on charges of collaboration with armed
opponents appear to be politically motivated". (Ibid.)
And in all these abuses they have no respect f~r the rules for war whatsoever. Not only did
the RPF conscript children into its ranks when it was a rebel movement, but the Rwandan
government continues to do so.
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The report also highlights the increasing recruitment of
children into fighting forces, police, and armed civilian paramilitary
Local Defense Forces, including many children under 15 years of age,
and a substantial number of children less than 12 years old [... ].
Children suffer disproportionately from the general rigours of the
combatant's life, especially in the bush and are particularly vulnerable
to disease and malnutrition. Frequently ill-treated or even killed by the
commanders, they have no protectors. (Ibid)
When asked to reflect on possible solutions to conflict, a peace activist in Goma,
quoted by Mamdani, mused: "One needs to ask the indigenous people whether they can chase
away all the Rwandese and ask the Rwandese whether they can kill all indigenes" (Mamdani
2000: 260). Unwittingly, he had thrown light on the kinds of fears that fed popular
stereotypes: the Rwandans fear that they may be chased by the "indigenes", and the
"indigenes" fear that they may be killed by the Rwandans (Ibid). Such fears are the reality in
the postgenocide period. Despite the official pronouncements of members of government and
parliament in Rwanda, which require people to believe that they are committed to respect
human rights, national reconciliation and the rule of law, the reality is otherwise. In its report
of 1998, Amnesty International said: "we would like to believe the claims of some Rwandese
and foreign government representatives that the human rights situation is improving, [... ] but
the evidence of daily killings and 'disappearances' throughout January and February points to
the contrary" (http://web.arnnesty.org/ai.nsf/).
In these circumstances, is it possible to describe the state of Rwanda at the present
time as 'transitional'? The present Rwandan government cannot be called a transitional
government for not only did it not abandon the inhuman policies of committing crimes against
humanity and violating human rights, but it is not democratic, nor has it expressed the
intention of moving towards democracy. Though it has been its policy to conceal its activities
since its return from Uganda to Rwanda, human rights activists have been able to track RPF
activities. Most of the reports however were not published since they might have endangered
Rwandan officials, or implicated other countries. This was still the case in 2001.
It has become increasingly difficult and dangerous for human rights
defenders to investigate reports of human rights abuses and to publish
the result of their investigations. They are frequently harassed and
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prevented from doing their work,· and some have been arrested
arbitrarily and tortured.
( http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print!AFR620152001)
International motives for denying the occurrence of genocide will be discussed later,
as part of the discussion of the international community's role in the Rwandan drama. Secret
murders and arrests did not stop with the RPF's victory of July 1994. With the cessation of
hostilities, members of the RPF concentrated on eliminating all opposition, even when this
involved secret violations of human rights. The first massive human rights violations
perpetrated in Rwanda by the newly established regime succeeded, with the complicity of the
international community, forcibly to repatriate Hutu refugees from Zaire to Rwanda during
the First Rebellion. Many of the refugees died on the return journey, and others were killed on
their return. Some refugees in camps started wondering how they were going to survive the
deprivations of camp life within the hostile Tanzanian community. Was there any chance of
going back? How were they going to be received by RPF, of which they knew so little? The
few who knew about RPF had heard of the killings perpetrated in the Byumba and Kibungo
prefectures when it occupied this region, along with its behaviour on the battlefield during
wartime. This was proof enough for them that they would not be tolerated, since they would
be the only target. It must not be forgotten that, in general, refugees were under pressure from
those who opposed repatriation. Those who wanted a better life were forced to choose
between harassment by Tanzanians and the possibility of death at the hands of the RPF in
Rwanda. Meanwhile, the new regime in Rwanda had two preoccupations: (1) to prove to the
international community that it was committed to end the problem of Rwandan refugees by
returning all of them to their homeland, and (2) most importantly, to avoid any chance of
possible reorganisation of the vanquished Forces Annees Rwandaises (ex-FAR) and
Interahamwe within the camps. It is this last motive that pushed RPF to carry out the forced
repatriation of refugees from Tanzania, helped by Tanzanian forces and UNHCR (United
Nations High Commission for Refugees) which provided transport and goods. Camps were
surrounded by Tanzanian forces and RPF soldiers, leaving only a corridor to Rwanda through
the border post Rusumo in Kibungo prefecture. People had to walk back by the same route as
they had fled. But this time the route was predetermined and narrowed by soldiers on both
sides. It is this movement that was described by the media, UNHCR and the Rwandan
government as 'the free repatriation of refugees'. From the thousands who left Tanzania,
only a few reached their homes and they were mostly children and old women. UNHCR,
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despite its claims that it was helping people to return to their country, was unable to control
these 'disappearances' of returning refugees. Once they had occurred, UNHCR started
wondering whether it had been wise to have obliged those people come back. Amnesty
International said "The human rights organisations express their grave concern that
neighbouring governments continue to repatriate refugees to Rwanda where many face a
dangerous fate."
( http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/AFR470371997?OpenDocument )
The repatriation from Zaire was more or less the same as from Tanzania. But in Zaire,
where there was open warfare in eastern Zaire, the majority who returned to Rwanda were
non-combatants. It is likely that some Rwandans wanted to be repatriated. The cholera
epidemic of late 1994, in which thousands of lives were lost, had created a nostalgic feeling of
wanting to go back and die, at least, in the motherland. For an adult Rwandan, to die on a
foreign land is a tragic loss. Many men and women were separated as they entered Rwanda,
and the men were never seen again. The 'rescapes' (returning exiles who survived the
journey) were followed and hunted in their communities, often wrongly accused and charged
with genocide, and sentenced without trial. Amnesty International in 1997 says: "In the
climate of bitterness and suspicion which prevailed after the genocide, many defendants
accused of genocide are considered guilty unless proved innocent" ( www.amnesty.org ).
Meanwhile, throughout the country there was what was called 'ingando', a kind of forced
military-training, with the official aim to 're-educate people in washing them of the genocidal
ideas and make them good people'. During these 'ingando' many lives were mysteriously
lost, and similar numbers of deaths seem to have occurred in military camps for new recruits.
In fact, since Rwanda was at war with Zaire, a massive recruitment was underway. During
one of the searches for corpses of victims of the April 1994 genocide, one hole was found
with skeletons covered with flesh; it was declared part of the 1994 genocide. This was in
1996. People doubted whether human flesh could survive bacterial decomposition for nearly
two years.
Besides killing, other equally fatal strategies were used, where people were intended to
believe that victims had died natural deaths. One of the methods was to create famine in
Rwanda by ordering the population to cut down all the plantations of bananas in the most
fertile region of the country (north and northwest) and then force them to live in controlled
camps far from their cultivable land. "Houses are standing empty with their doors hanging
open; the fields are deserted; the crops have been cut down or burned," Amnesty International
said, describing the countryside surrounding Gisenyi town. "The Army has ordered the
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population to cut down their banana plantations to deprive insurgents of their hiding place."
(http://web.amnesty.org/AFR470061998 ).
Finally, from camps they were forced into 'villages,' thus worsening the situation.
T~ough the government has declared that the programme of 'villagisation' was meant to
improve the economic situation of the people, it was later noticed that the real aim was to
control the opposition forces attacks.
Since 1995, the government had been resettling Rwandans returned from outside the
country and the internally displaced in 'villages', refusing to allow them to live in the
scattered homes near agricultural land customary in Rwanda. Government insisted that
'villagisation' would promote economic development and improve delivery services to the
population. As applied in the northwest, however, the programme appeared to be meant
primarily to reduce the likelihood of a new insurgency. By late 1999, 94 percent of the
population of Kibungo and 60 percent of the population of Mutara, both prefectures in the
east, had been moved into villages, as had 40 percent of the population of the prefectures
surrounding the capital of Kigali. In addition, 94 percent of the population of the northwest
who had been in camps had been moved to the new sites, where they were obliged to live in
temporary shelters, under plastic sheeting, while building new houses. Persons who resisted
these orders were fined or imprisoned. Despite government promises, most sites offered no
services (water, schools, clinics) and residents often had to walk much further to cultivate
their fields (http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-08.htm ).
Though some parts of the country are more vulnerable and more targeted than others,
there is no peace of mind in general. The daily reality of thousands of Rwandan men and
women is epitomised in the following testimonies. "It is dark here." "We are waiting to die."
"We breathe a sigh of relief when 24 hours go by then we worry about the next 24 hours. It is
like a 24-hours contract." "We go to sleep knowing from one day to the next that we may not
be here ... " (http://web.amnestv.org/ai.nsf/print/AFR470371997? )
This living hell for all ordinary Rwandans is little known.
"They are suffering in silence, their fate largely ignored by the outside world" (Ibid.)
The investigation of human rights abuses in Rwanda is very risky and almost
impossible. However, the little that so far has been done by human activists such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch shows that post-genocide Rwanda was characterised
by a thorough, planned, systematic and accurately carried out killing, targeting unarmed
civilians. The majority of victims were Hutu, though the 'unfaithful and stupid Tutsi' was also
killed. A thorough study of these killings might reveal that Rwanda is experiencing a second
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major phase of genocide. These killings of Hutu are inaccurately called executions. Of course
when the government is targeting those Hutu, it says that they are Interahamwe. And because
the 1994 genocide is blamed on Interahamwe, the conscious or unconscious thought is that
every Interahamwe, because he is guilty of genocide, deserves to pay. This payment IS
nothing less than death. In the current judicial system in Rwanda, the death penalty IS
applicable to every person found guilty of genocide; and Interahamwe is ipso facto guilty of
genocide. An Interahamwe is not conceived of as a normal human, a being with human
morality; but rather as an animal, a monster. This reduces moral responsibility. Nevertheless,
even if we accepted that all Hutu are Interahamwe, following the definition of genocide given
by the UN and the actions in relation with genocide which are punishable, we might argue that
extermination of the Interahamwe as a group would also be an act of genocide. In the UN
resolution 955 (1994), in Article 2 of the annex to the Statute of International Tribunal for
Rwanda we read:
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children from one group to another.
3. The following shall be punishable:
a) Genocide
b) Conspiracy to genocide
c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide
d) Attempt to commit genocide
e) Complicity in genocide ( www.ictr.org/ ).
The key point here is the intention. If you destroy with the intention to eliminate the group as
a whole or a part, then you are guilty of genocide. But to find out the intention is not an easy
task and there is a big chance of error. Beyond that, because the law has to be interpreted, it
appears that the UN is not clear about what kind of group killing constitutes genocide. Is it
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any kind of group? Is it committing genocide, for instance, to try to eliminate a group of
terrorists? Perhaps it would be genocide, because hunting terrorists should not aim to destroy
them, but to bringing them to justice. If Interahamwe are the general enemy, because they are
taken to be responsible for the Rwandan genocide, they should not kill but brought to justice.
Whether 'justice' might use capital punishment to destroy them is a different question,
because one can argue that the intention of justice would not be to destroy but to punish.
Nonetheless, even if we agree that capital punishment may be part of the judicial process, is it
the final goal, the end of justice? The justice that would end in punishment would no longer
be justice. The aim of justice should rather be to redress the moral equilibrium in social
interactions. With capital punishment, there is no chance given to the offender to correct him
or herself, to correct his or her behaviour. However, the judicial system believes that capital
punishment provides an example to the rest of the population with the same inclination, to
deter them from committing an offence. This still is an ongoing debate. If in this case of the
Interahamwe, the group is brought to the justice, any penalty which is inflicted will not
constitute genocide. In Rwanda at present, however, the name Interahamwe tends to be given
to any person or group which the authorities wish to eliminate.
One of the motives that the RPF gave when launching a war against the Habyalimana
regime was the wish to achieve democracy. RPF claimed that there was no democracy in
Rwanda, though the French Government had succeeded in pressuring Habyalimana to begin
the democratization of the political system. However, very soon it was realised that the RPF's
policies were not democratic. In the RPF, everything works like in a traditional patriarchal
family where the father has a final veto in everything. It is also worthwhile to recall here that
RPF conceives itself not as a political organization, but as a family in which every single
member, if he or she wants to remain a member of that family, must be faithful to the ruling
ideology. The 'elders' in the family are the custodians of this ideology, and this group of
elders, (who are not necessarily the 'aged,' but are either founders of RPF or younger
members co-opted by these founders) has the last say in every decision. It is this tight control
that cannot be challenged that has led many politicians to resign, or be forced to resign and to
go into exile, though some of them had embraced enthusiastically the victorious RPF,
believing that they were liberated from the Habyalimana dictatorship. Within seven years of
coming to power, the Rwandan government has had in succession five Prime Ministers, and
several other members of Government and National Assembly have gone into exile. It was the
forced resignation of President Pasteur Bizimungu in March 2001, a Hutu president who had
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no right of decision and who served as a puppet for the (Tutsi) Vice-president Major General
Paul Kagame, that put an end to the illusion that the Rwandan regime was democratic and not
group-based. In its report of 2001, Amnesty International said:
Political tension increased following the departure from office of
senior political figures perceived as critical of the RPF leadership.
Joseph Sebarenzi Kabuye, former speaker of the National Assembly,
fled Rwanda in January, in March the RPF, acting with the National
Assembly, forced the resignation of President Pasteur Bizimungu, a
Hutu who had been included in the inner circle of power since the
early days of RPF. The vice-president, Major General Kagame, took
over as President in April ( www.amnesty.org/ ).
The Human Rights Watch gives more or less the same information below.
The Speaker of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister and the
President all quit their posts under pressure within the first three
months of the year [2001], leaving a shrinking circle of power-holders
in control of the Rwandan government. The former vice-president,
Kagame, was elected president in April by the assembly, and for the
first time openly presided over the government he had reputedly run
from behind the scenes since 1994. Kagame, from the Tutsi minority,
replaced a Hutu president, thus ending the practice of having a
member of the majority ethnic group serve as titular head of the
republic. A reshuffle of cabinet positions gave ten of the eighteen seats
to Kagame's party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), violating the
arrangements made III the Arusha Accords of 1994.
(http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/africa/rwanda.html)
If Pasteur Bizimungu had taken so long 'to resign, despite all the evidence that Hutu
were being used to cover the RPF policy of ethnic segregation, it was either because he
believed that he could use political power to pursue his interests or because he was naYve
enough to believe that he could effect change from within RPF.
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Since RPF came in power in 1994, political parties are nominally allowed but may not
recruit or hold public meetings. They are forbidden to oppose the ideology of RPF. This still
was so in 2001 when Amnesty International reported:
The RPF-Ied government retained tight political control of the
country. Open political opposition was not tolerated. Despite signs of
growing internal dissatisfaction from the genocide survivors and from
dissident RPF members, no significant political opposition emerged in
the country. Both the RPF and the government were criticized for
being dominated by members of the Tutsi ethnic group (Ibid.).
So far allegedly democratic elections were organised at the two lowest levels of
administration, the first, in the cities, small divisions corresponding to wards, and in the
countryside divisions of about fifty households; the second consisting of larger divisions,
constituting about five hundred households. The crowd was to gather and candidates would
volunteer or be chosen from the crowd. They then had to stand up, with their supporters lining
up behind them. Candidates were not allowed to look at their supporters; in theory a candidate
might stand without supporters. Foreign observers believed this was a perfectly free election;
they did not notice the strong military presence that influenced all actions. The RPF tolerates
no opposition. It prevents any free choice; for example, that between voting and not voting.
This makes people believe that there is no alternative to their rule. People were afraid to
appear unwilling to co-operate with the new regime. In Human Rights Watch Report 2001 we
read:
In early 1999, the government which had been in power since. 1994
organized its first elections. Nearly 90 percent of adult Rwandans
voted for officials at the two most local levels of government. The
elections, carried out by lining up behind candidates, departed from
the usual Rwandan practice of voting by secret ballot. In some places,
soldiers and civilian authorities used force or threats to try to compel
hesitant persons to vote or to stand for office. In a case documented by
a local human rights organization, a man was jailed for two days in the
northwest after he had declined to serve in a post to which he had been
elected against his will. (http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-OS.htm)
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The first weakness of this electoral system, that of lining up behind the candidate, is the lack
of secrecy, which limits freedom of expression. The second weakness is that the system
cannot be further extended or applied to regional or national levels of governance. Its
feasibility at local levels depends on the presence of candidates and voters in the same place.
But this is obviously not applicable when the candidate is at national level and has to be
elected by an entire region or country. If an election on a high level of governance were to be
made, surely another alternative would have to be chosen? This lack of consistency in the
system is the main characteristic of current Rwandan governance and has been so since the
new regime came to power in 1994. When it comes to the rule of law in the case of Rwanda,
the principles applied have been inconsistent. Every situation has had its own regulatory laws.
From the beginning until the present day, the Rwandan government has used three
constitutions or laws:
a) the Arusha Accords of 1994
b) the Constitution voted by the new National Assembly after its creation
c) the Internal Constitution to RPF which in most cases becomes a measure for all the
others.
The authorities then use one of the three according to their needs.
A typical example is that of the post of vice-presidency. This post was recognised in the
Arusha Accords because the RPF could not control the presidency, whose incumbent had the
final power of veto. Habyalimana was still in power, and there were other major parties inside
.the country, like MDR. The agreement negotiated between all parties, including RPF, was to
leave the presidency to MRND, represented by Habyalimana. The Prime Minister was to be
from the MDR, the second major party after MRND. But RPF still wanted a high post to
ensure control, when the president was absent. It was then that the post of vice-president was
created. In taking over power by military means in 1994, the RPF maintained this post, for it
was an even better cover for its ethnic segregational policies. They tolerated the presence of a
Hutu president, who was nevertheless insignificant in decision-making. Kagame, the vice-
president, was the real leader of the country. When the Hutu president resigned, Kagame was
appointed president by the national assembly. On taking office, he abolished the post of vice-
president which, according to the Arusha Accords of 1994, should have been ta~en by a major
party other than RPF. It is still a daily practice in Rwanda government for cabinet members to
meet and extend mandates which otherwise would have expired. The example here is of
people in detention, which we find in Human Rights Watch Report of 2001:
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The government repeatedly extended deadlines permitting the
detention of persons without any case files, a practice otherwise
forbidden by Rwandan law. In December 1999, a new deadline was
set for June 2001. An estimated 18,000 persons were held without
files, some of them detained since 1994.
(http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/Africa/rwanda.html)
Another telling example is found in Human Rights Watch Report of 1999.
In mid-1999, national political leaders decreed that the current
government would not step down at the end of its five-year mandate,
as specified in the Arusha Accords of 1994, but would continue to rule
for at least another four years. If the government as a whole was to
stay, some of its members had already been replaced. In December,
the Minister of State for internal affairs fled the country after her
brothers were arrested on charges of aiding the insurgents and shortly
after, the Minister of Justice also chose exile, apparently after his
repeated efforts to curb military interference in judicial decisions had
failed. In February, the government was reshuffled, with those
dismissed reportedly accused of corruption and incompetence.
(http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-08.htm) .
All these cases of manipulation of the law in order to remam III power confirm what
Mamdani says, that Tutsi want to hold onto power at all costs for it is in that power that they
believe their survival lies.
As the Congolese Tutsi legal adviser to the secretary-general of the Alliance puts it,
"In Rwanda, the Tutsi have reached a conclusion that power is the only guarantee for their
right to life, otherwise they will be killed by the Hutu." The newly appointed Rwandan
commander of the Congolese army echoed that same thought: "The Tutsi are just a scared
group, from 1959, 1973, 1994. They will feel no assurance until they are protected by Tutsi
themselves. That is natural". (Mamdani 2001: 261)
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1. The Unique Case of Rwanda
T~e specialness of the Rwandan case can not be only that it is a case of genocide, for it is not
the first genocide to happen in the world-the attempted extermination of the Jews by the
Nazis was the first atrocity in the history of mankind to be recognised and acknowledged as
genocide, but others had preceded it. The way in which this genocide was unique was the
involvement of the mass of the population, what we may call 'popular genocide' as opposed
to 'bureaucratic genocide.' Under the Nazi regime, the extermination of Jews was carefully
planned; every killing followed an explicit order from the competent authority and most of the
time this order was written down. Almost everything was documented and the executions -
ordered by a competent authority -followed the described and detailed method of killing.
This made it possible to find the records of different people that were killed and where they
were killed. It is this character that makes the Jewish genocide a 'bureaucratic genocide'. The
Rwandan genocide was not documented. There are no records of those killed, nor any explicit,
written authorisation for the killing of such a person in a set manner, on a given date. Though
launched by leaders who feared that they had more to lose than the rest of the population, the
killings that followed were more or less spontaneous, carried out by groups that sometimes
could not be controlled even by those leaders. The genocide happened randomly and with
popular support. This is what makes the Rwandan genocide unique and 'popular'. By unique
and 'popular' I mean that the killers were not a specially designated group. The mass of the
population responded to the invitation to kill and participated massively. This makes it a
popular genocide. It is unique because it is the only genocide in which the population was
mobilized successfully.
As we have said in the beginning of this chapter, the genocide happened in Rwanda
while it did not in South Africa. What is the contrast between the apartheid regime and that
which allowed, and indeed encouraged genocide? During the Apartheid era, there were few
perpetrators though many people who consented and believed that they benefited from racial
murders. The violence was hidden, carried out by the shadowy death squads, which destroyed
with great care the evidence of their acts; the victims were part of the majority. During the
genocide in Rwanda, there were more perpetrators and fewer beneficiaries and the violence
was perpetrated in daylight by the mass of the population with no care to destroy evidence.
The victims were the minority and no one came to help (Mamdani 2001).
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The UN was silent while the Rwandan situation deteriorated, but eventually, impelled
by the 1994 catastrophe, along with the new regime, the Rwandan government centred on
Kigali-it helped to establish a judicial system (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda)
to prosecute the 'genocidaires.' In order to understand this judicial system, it will be
necessary to consider first the responsibility and accountability of the post-genocide
Rwandans.
2. Responsibility and Accountability:
From the outset of the crisis, the RPF has successfully managed international opinion by
convindng 'everybody' that the Tutsi were targeted and became victims, and that the Hutu
were responsible for slaughtering them. The result was that every Hutu was responsible and
accountable for the genocide and every Tutsi was a victim to whom justice was due. This
propaganda has not only hindered any attempt at an impartial analysis, thus making it difficult
to know the truth, but also gave to some of those responsible the unjustifiable justification: tu
quoque. What is meant here is that while some of those responsible were ready to recognize
their wrongdoing, they saw themselves carrying a double burden (for themselves and their
accomplices in crime) and responded that if they have to be prosecuted, every wrongdoer had
to be prosecuted too. While Adedeji and the Human Rights report (considered earlier in this
study) concludes that the responsibility lay with the Hutu, Mamdani comes up with a more
balanced analysis showing that members of both groups were guilty of genocide.
3. The Question of Blame
Talking about his fellow South Africans vis-a-vis responsibility, Archbishop Desmond
Tutu says:
When God accosted Adam and remonstrated with him about
contravening the order He had given about eating a certain fruit, Adam
was less than forthcoming in accepting responsibility for that
disobedience. He shifted the blame to Eve, and when God turned to
her she did the same and tried to pass the buck. (We are not told how
the serpent responded to the blame pushed on to it.) So we should not
have been surprised at how reluctant most people were to
acknowledge their responsibility for the atrocities of apartheid. They
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were just being true descendants of Adam and Eve when they denied
what they had done or blamed everyone and everything except
themselves (Tutu 1999: 73).
Rwandans, like South Africans, are unwilling to assume responsibility, and their reluctance is
expressed in their culture and daily language. Bad things are always blamed on someone else,
especially the weaker. That is why in a household for instance, a man is never wrong. Only a
woman and children can be wrong. In social organisations, the holder of authority is never
wrong, as he is taken to be the head of the community he administers. If the weak person
cannot blame the stronger it does not mean that she acknowledges the blame. She rather
accepts it as fate and everybody knows that it is because of the stronger person that she is
guilty. If, however, she is really responsible, it is obvious because the stronger would not need
to justify himself.
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the fact that Rwandans characteristically refuse publicly
to admit their responsibility, they recognize it deep down inside themselves. Perhaps what
they fear is not the acknowledgement of their wrongdoing but the humiliation that might
result from this knowledge by the public. Humiliation is very strongly felt in Rwandan
culture. That is why Rwandans tend to be secretive. Given that this attitude is developed in
childhood, keeping secrets becomes almost natural. The first thing that a Rwandan child
learns is to hide his emotional state. This is more strongly emphasised for boys especially
when it comes to painful feelings, than for girls. A boy, or even more, a man, is expected to
remain strong in any circumstances. If, despite their characteristic openness, admitting
responsibility was difficult for South Africans, how difficult can it be for Rwandans with this
cultural habit of secrecy?
In order to follow this line of thought further, let us recall what has been said so far
concerning oppression throughout Rwandan history. According to the case studies offered
earlier, throughout Rwandan history, a belief in Tutsi superiority, first held by the elite, and
then reinforced by the colonizer, existed in Rwanda.
In the formative days of Rwandan society, the Rwandan state was a small kingdom
called "U Rwanda rwa gasabo" somewhere around Muhazi Lake in the centre of Rwanda.
People whose main activity was pastoralism populated this kingdom. These people later
became known as Tutsi. The need for more pastureland led this kingdom to launch attacks on
neighbouring kingdoms and principalities. The annexation of new kingdoms and principalities
went along with the subjugation of their people. This subjugation however was not severe or
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exclusive, but tended to be'inclusive. The new inhabitants of the enlarged Rwanda could mix
with their conquerors. Slowly cattle, which were mainly owned by the conqueror, became the
symbol and general measure of wealth. The person who had more cows than the others was
considered to be the richest. This, added to military superiority, made the Tutsi, who had both
cattle and military power; believe that they were not like everybody else. Rwandan society
was then subdivided into two groups, not a Hutu group and a Tutsi group, but a group of Tutsi
elite with rich Hutu and a group of 'petit Tutsi' or poor Tutsi with the majority of Hutu.
According to Mamdani (2001), this subdivision, based on economic criteria, existed until the
reign of King Rwabugiri (1860-95).
The "Nyiginya" lineage of kings and their entourage succeeded in imposing itself as
superior and born-to-rule, and oppressed the rest of the population, the lower class of the Tutsi
and Hutu. This was altered, according to Mamdani (2001), by King Rwabugiri, when to be a
Tutsi meant to be in power or near power in order to benefit from it. The higher ranking Tutsi
therefore appear to have instigated the hostility between the two major population groups. Did
they plan this? While some (Human Rights Watch Report 1999) believe that there was prior
planning, the reality shows that the belief in Tutsi superiority gradually changed into a will to
eliminate the Hutu; this is also Mamdani' s point.
However, it can be seen that before and after independence (1961) a general belief
arose in the equality of all Rwanda citizens, including Hutu and poorer class Tutsi. This
gradually changed into a general hatred of all Tutsi and the will to eradicate them as
oppressors. While the idea of 'born-to-rule' was becoming a distant memory after the
independence in 1962, the attacks of Inyenzi soon reaffirmed that they were still holding onto
their ideology of superiority.
Few Rwandans could have been unaware that when the Tutsi
army in neighboring Burundi unlea~hed terror on the Hutu in 1972 and
killed nearly 200,000, it did not go for the lives of ordinary Hutu but
for those of school-going youth. The objective was crush the flower
from which could come tomorrow's intelligentsia. Anyone who had
come out of the colonial period u~derstood that the existence of an
intelligentsia .was the prerequisite for initiative, independence, and
leadership. (Mamdani 2001: 230)
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It is likely that the final occun'ence that brought to an end the Hutu' s uncertainty about
whether Tutsi might one day allow Hutu to be power-sharers with them was Ndadaye's
assassination in Burundi. If Ndadaye's death was taken as a prophetic lesson that the
alternatives for the Hutu lay between power and servitude, that there could be no power
sharing between Hutu and Tutsi [my italics], Habyalimana's death was a signal that the hour
to choose between power and servitude had indeed struck (Ibid: 215). Burundi was a case
where the Tutsi had always been in power and the killings of Hutu by Tutsi Burundians had a
strong impact on Rwandans.
Despite the fact that Burundian history presented a milder version of Tutsi power and
Hutu servitude, Burundi had come to be seen in the second half of the twentieth century by
Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi alike as some sort of an accursed Siamese twin. For Hutu in post-
1959 Rwanda, Burundi presented a real life portrayal of what it would be like for them to
continue to live under Tutsi power. The mass killing of Hutu schoolchildren and intellectuals
in 1972 gave the Great Lakes region the first sight of a genocidal wave of killing (Mamdani
2001: 215).
Could any reasonable Rwandan Hutu ignore all these telling facts? Their fears,
however, did not prevent Habyalimana, once in power, from adopting policies and
perspectives promoting peace and reconciliation among all Rwandans. The Tutsi RPF party,
as has been shown, rejected his attempts at reconciliation because they wanted sole power.
"The growing appeal of Hutu power propaganda among the Hutu masses was in direct
proportion to the spreading conviction that the real aim of the RPF was not rights' for all
Rwandans, but power for the Tutsi" (Ibid: 191)
Did the noble Tutsi know that his actions might have fatal consequences for himself
as his fellows in general? It is likely that he believed that he was simply serving his immediate
interests. Ignorance made him believe that things would always be on his side. The Hutu seem
to have been pushed into this inflammatory situation, but this cannot justify the violence of
their reactions. Even though they did not have a preconceived plan, they deliberately met
violence with violence. The Tutsi were determined not to be passive victims, and adopted a
course of equally violent action in order, as many of them believed, to 'defend' themselves. It
is this policy of 'self-defence' and a more generalized hatred of all Hutu that motivated the
RPF to cross the border into the Congo. This crossing cost and has continued to cost many
lives from both the Rwandan refugee group and the local Congolese. In terms of Human
Rights violations, both Hutu and Tutsi are to blame. In so far as the Tutsi were fighting to
retain unjust privilege, they must be regarded as being to responsible. But setting aside
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historical factors, we should consider a single action of the RPF government with respect to
intended civilian liquidation. This example is of the Kibeho massacres in Gikongoro
Prefecture, where the RPF soldiers slaughtered unarmed civilians in 1999 under the UN Blue
Helmetss.
About 150,000 refugees, standing shoulder to shoulder on a mountain
plateau the size of three football fields. When I first see them, they've
been standing there for almost three days. Somewhere in this sea of
humanity there are supposed to be two small camps of the United
Nations 'ZarnBat' unit, peacekeepers from Zambia, but I don't see
them anywhere.
There's no room to sit down on the plateau. The refugees are squeezed
together above their belongings; their legs spread across the bodies of
old people and children too tired to stand. Rwandan troops in long
raincoats, guns slung over their shoulders, some wearing black berets,
are posted every ten metres around the throng they've driven together.
[... ] The soldiers of the Rwandan government have chased the
inhabitants from their huts in the surrounding valleys and herded them
on to the plateau. Now they're keeping them covered. With the
evacuation of the camp completed, the Rwandan soldiers, all Tutsis,
have apparently run out of order. [... ] The refugees are paralysed with
misery. They don't seem to hear the blue helmets' 'out of the way!' or
feel it when they're roughly shoved aside. Step by step we make our
way through the masses. I see only faces, dull eyes and lips chapped
with thirst. The ground beneath my feet is covered with anonymous
personal effects and the occasional human. I can't see the soil itself.
[... ] Just as the Rwandan Government soldiers surround their Hutu
prisoners to keep them from escaping, so the Zambian blue helmets
surround their school to keep the Hutus from trampling it. [... ] Two
nights ago they heard gunshots, the UN soldier tells me. 'We got down
behind the sandbags right away; we had no idea who was shooting
whom. May be they were even shooting us. The ground was shaking,
5 UN troops, from a variety of countries, were distinguished by their blue helmets.
but we thought it was tanks, couldn't believe it was tens of thousands
of people running. Not until we saw them climbing out of the valley
towards us. They came running in from all sides, screaming, straight at
us, with about a thousand government soldiers firing at them. [... ]
ZamBat was just dragging the last bodies away from the school gates
when the government soldiers came up to Captain Francis. 'We are
taking over here. The refugees are going home', they announced. They
didn't say how the refugees would get home and it still isn't clear. The
Hutu aren't allowed to walk home. [... ]But United Nations troops
aren't allowed to take part in the deportation of prisoners. Voluntary
status is a criterion for UN passengers, and the inhabitants of Kibeho
haven't volunteered for this [... ]. These people haven't had anything
to eat or drink since the day before yesterday. They are going out of
their minds with thirst. [... ] The American says that he thinks he has
convinced the Rwandan commander to allow a water tanker through
by pointing out to him that water will help move the refugees. [... ]
'There is a tanker with 18,000 litres of drinking water.[ ... ] How to
distribute this water to 150,000 dehydrated refugees? How to go? By a
cup at a time? What about the speed? But let's do it anyway. [... ] We
watch a group of refugees, about six of them, break away from the
crowd and start running into the valley. They are trying to break the
siege! Rwandan troops start firing immediately. We see the refugees
fall. Dead. Their bodies roll down the rocks to the bottom of the
valley, and come to a halt at the trampled huts. [... ] I watch the blue
helmets watching the killing around them, eyes and mouths wide open
in disbeliefs, as if they're screaming without making a sound. I keep
watching until the sun's gone down and it's pitch-black on the plateau.
[... ] We called the masses of people 'IDPs', Internally Displaced
Persons; UN jargon for refugees in their own country. Through the
brick walls of the mess we can hear IDPs being executed. Each
gunshot is followed by the screams of onlookers, fearing for their own
lives. [... ] 'Here, take it', a Zambian calls as he balances one foot on
the gate and the other on the roof. He's holding a baby by one arm. Its
eyes have rolled up in its head. 'Come on, take it!' Above me, another
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baby is dangling from a soldier's hand. The people outside are trying
to rescue their children by throwing them over the gate to us. 'Take it,
take it', the blue helmet shouts in desperation.
I grab one baby after another, some screaming, some unconSCIOUS,
others already dead. The Zambian soldiers, holding on the top of the
gate with one hand so they won't fall, catch the children and swing.
them over to us in one easy movement. [... ]
For the first time since my arrival in Kibeho, I can see the other
Zambian camp, on the far side of the plateau. Then I realised that
refugees are still there, it's just that none of them are standing up. The
Hutus and their possessions have merged into one hideous, soaked
rubbish dump, reaching to the end of the world.
We peer down the road littered with dead bodies, looking for
reinforcement on the horizon. There are none. The reason is obvious:
Rwandan troops are busy dragging away all bodies that can be seen
from the road. [... ] In the parking lot, the Rwandan president, Pasteur
Bizimungu asks Captain Francis for his estimate of casualties. Francis
cautiously puts it at 4,000. The president is not pleased. 'I think you
are exaggerating', he says coolly. He'd rather stick to the 300 his
soldiers reported to him". [Text greatly shortened and slightly
modified].
(Polman, L., 1999; 'The problem outside', Granta 67: 217-240)
This is the testimony of Linda Polman, a journalist from Holland, from her visit to Rwanda in
1995. Some others journalists and Human Rights activists were also present when these
massacres occurred but nothing was done to prevent or even to publicly condemn the
slaughters. Yet the Rwandan crisis surely affects the world, and is not only internal to
Rwanda.
The colonizer has also played a key role in the Rwandan drama. He is the one who
politicized and rigidified ethnic differences first by making Tutsi an alien race and Hutu an
indigenous ethnic group and rendering this difference in identification documents. However,
can it be argued that his intentions were to lay the foundations of future genocide? Though in
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some parts of Africa, and the world in general, it may have the case, the intention of· the
colonizer in Rwanda was not to destroy the population but to maximize his interests.
Whereas the prototype of settler violence in the history of modern
colonialism is the near-extermination of Amerindians in the New
WorId, the prototype of settler violence in the African colonies was
the German annihilation of over 80 percent of the Herero population in
the colony of German South West Africa in a single year, 1904.
(Mamdani 2001: 10)
Mamdani points out that "settler colonisation led to land deprivation" (!bid). The big
mistake of the co1onizer in German South West Africa and America was to overlook the
dignity of humans in favour of his selfish interests. But if the coloniser succeeded in further
dividing the Rwandan people, it was because Rwandans already conceived of themselves as
two separate groups, Hutu and Tutsi. We have to recall that when the colonial regime
proposed that Tutsi supremacy be formalised, through superior education and other privileges,
the Tutsi wholeheartedly accepted these privileges, since they corresponded to the group's
ideas about its rights. They were, first and foremost, acceptable because they reinforced their
own conception of their proper position as compared to that of the Hutu, which can be traced
back in history. Moreover, in accordance with the concept of Tutsi supremacy, Tutsi were
given preferential treatment. The Hutu, however, found themselves faced by a situation in
which they had no power to alter anything. Furthermore, this double confIrmation of Tutsi
superiority, first by the Tutsi themselves and then by the colonizer, somehow convinced the
Hutu that it must be the case that they were inferior. Both Hutu and Tutsi accepted the policies
of the colonizer, though with different feelings. The Tutsi rejoiced because their domination
was approved by a third party. The Hutu were more and more subjugated, neglected and
victimised. Since they were the favourites of the coloniser, the Tutsi had more chance to
change the situation. They were in the middle between Hutu and the colonizer. If, in their
position of power, Tutsi were ignorant as to how the rest of the population was suffering, they
might well have considered their own subjugation to the colonizer. Though they had power
over the Hutu, the colonizer had equal or more power over them. With this double image, the
Tutsi were in a good position to do something that could have changed the situation. Their
understanding of how it felt to be dominated by another group might well have made them
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unwilling to take the risk of allowing the Hutu (who, it must be remembered, were· the
majority group) equal rights. They feared the loss of their own privileges, and were not ready
for that. So both groups, unfortunately, accepted the divisive policies of the colonizer. As a
result, Rwandans in general are to blame.
While the Human Rights Watch Report of 1999 believes that the genocide was
definitely premeditated and puts all responsibility for planning on the Habyalimana regime,
Mamdani believes that the planning came later while the genocide was underway. It was a
result of a defeat on the battlefield that led Hutu hardliners to want to eliminate Tutsi inside
the country.
Helmut Strizek in his article "Kigali 6 April 1994, le jour oil l' Afrique bascula, (Africa
Intemational, No Double 322/ 323 /Apri1199 pp 41 - 53) believes that the person most aware
of the whole drama was Kagame, who headed the RPF troops. According to Strizek, if
Kagame had allowed it, the crisis would have stopped and the conflicts would have been
resolved peacefully. His argument is that the crucial moment when genocide began is the
death of Habyalimana. He argues that to know the truth about what happened in Rwanda, it is
necessary to discover the organizer of his death and the causes. He says:
No one can deny that this attempt (shooting down the presidential
plane) is the point of departure of systematic massacres of summer
1994 against the Tutsi minority in the region of Rwanda controlled by
a government ad interim. But also - a fact often neglected - at the
same time grave massacres against the Hutu population took place in
the region under RPF soldiers 'control "(Africa Intemational No.
322/323. 1999: 42)
As Mamdani says, the struggle for liberation changed into a struggle for occupation.
The goal of RPF was clear: it wanted power. What counted for Kagame was the military
victory of RPF at all costs, even if it involved the sacrifice of Tutsi inside the Gountry. And
Kagame knew that the way to achieve this was to eliminate Habyalimana because his death
would cause chaos in Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) and in the Hutu militia, probably
breaking down their control of the country. "RPF alone could be sure that no one would like
to take the power soon after the attempt, and that Hutu militia would react in a murderous
manner against Tutsi inside, attracting international opinion onto its [RPF's] side (Ibid: 44). It
is clear that everybody knew, even on the international level, that Tutsi were targeted before
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and after the murder of Habyalimana, but rather than seeking to prevent the worst, the RPF
chose victory at all costs, even provoking massacres of the people it was claiming to come and
liberate. Mamdami believes that the shooting down of Habyalimana's aircraft and Ndadaye's
assassination are the two turning points which made genocide inevitable.
As violence within Rwanda changed from deaths on the battlefield to the large scale slaughter
of civilians - to genocide, in fact - there were two further turning points. The first was the
assassination of the first Hutu president, Ndadaye, in the neighbouring Burundi. The second
was the assassination of Rwanda's own Hutu president, Habyalimana himself, and the murder
of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwingiyimana (Mamdani 2001: 215)
4. International responsibility
The international community was not unanimous with regard to the problems of
Rwanda. States had their own interests to defend. France, for example, was defending
francophone interests against the invading anglophone, identified with Uganda. Nonetheless,
when it came to any decision to be taken, through the United Nations or any other
international organisation, the USA dominated the scene. This USA domination is the reason
why its role is of great importance.
In the past the inertia of the international community was justified by the belief that
they did not really know what was going on. But since it is now clear that by 1999 it knew
about everything, the international community has more than ever some responsibility in the
Rwandan drama. Recent discoveries, according to which the international community,
especially the superpower countries that have a key role to play in peace-keeping through the
Security Council, knew everything that was happening in Rwanda and even-arguably-
allowed it to happen, pose serious questions and challenges which may oblige us and the UN
to take a new look at the Rwandan drama. Until this point it appears that what was happening
in Rwanda was seen as merely a local crisis, or as Mamdani says, a regional crisis. This new
look leads us to reconsider the role of UN in Rwandan history especially in periods of crisis.
In early 2001, it was discovered that Clinton's government knew about the entire Rwandan
situation and possessed all the documents but ~ad chosen to ignore the terrible situation. Yet
one of the American officials, interviewed on CNN, said, "We cannot change the past. We
have rather to focus on the future in order to prevent the reoccurrence".
The most important shaping force in the Hutu-Tutsi crisis was the influence of the
Belgians. Mamdani told us that European racial ideology was applied in Africa in the colonial
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period. It was in terms of this ideology that the Tutsi were seen, and encouraged to see
themselves, as a foreign civilising race, while the Hutu became the indigenous, and more
primitive majority. These divisive Belgian policies were certainly known and even approved
by United Nations because "Rwanda was a UN trust territory" (Mamdani 2001: 114). Thus
administrated by Belgium, Rwanda was under UN tutelage (Ibid.). As the UN believed that
each country had to take its destiny in its own hands, it started the process of decolonization,
preparing countries that were its trust territories for independence. In Rwanda this process of
decolonisation led to a change in administration and in other social interactions. The Belgian
colonizers, who so far had favoured the Tutsi side, doing everything in their power to
maintain the Tutsi as superior to the Hutu, began to support the Hutu cause. The irony is that
the Belgians made the Hutu more aware than ever of the discrimination they suffered. When
Belgians began to support the Hutu majority, it was the time for Tutsi to be discriminated
against. With the spread of UN ideas of democracy and independence in the middle of the
twentieth century, it became impossible to refuse a majority group its rights. This movement
was extended in western countries, particularly in United States of America and Canada in
1980s-1990s, to protect the rights of minority groups. This new ideology of minority rights
coincided with the RPF invasion of Rwanda. RPF was a minority seeking for its rights to be
addressed. In this move,one can argue, it is quite understandable that the United States, which
strongly supported the minority rights movements, could sympathize with the RPF.
It was Belgium, who, it must not be forgotten, had been mandated by the UN to
govern Rwanda, that created the first social dilemma in Rwanda. Belgium first promoted the
rights of the minority Tutsi, a civilising race, undermining the rights of the majority, an
indigenous majority to be civilised.
The sudden change from emphasis on minority rights to majority rights created an
imbalance of power in Rwanda. This imbalance was not adjusted into parity and equal rights
for all groups because Rwandan society as a whole believed that a minority's rights and a
majority's rights could not be addressed at the same time. The Belgians, like the pre-colonial
Rwandan groups, failed to conceive of equality for all groups as a solution to the country's
problems. It is moreover, in this climate of antagonism and mutual resentment that the 1959
revolution, a revolution called, rightly or mistakenly, a Hutu revolution, but in which the Hutu
majority could not have succeeded without the aid of the Belgians and United Nations, took
place. Though officially independent, Rwanda, like any other country of the Third World, was
always under western economic influence in general and the UN's influence in particular. In
order to get aid or a loan from any organisation of the United Nations or Western countries,
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tbepoor countries have to comply with certain conditions or policies, which in most cases, if
not always, favour the rich countries. The US has never ceased to show that the democracy it
cherishes in every political speech is for the powerful, the rich and not the poor; that human
rights are only for privileged humans. Rich people, indeed are more human than poor people,
white people more human than black people, Europeans more human than Asians or Africans.
As Donald W. Shriver 1995: An Ethic for Enemies says, even nowadays policies based on the
social inequality of black people and white people in United States still exist. And the
minority rights movements we mentioned earlier are there to address these inequalities, to
concern themselves -with the rights of the black community and the Spanish-speaking
community.
Not surprisingly, policies which serve America's interests applied and still apply in the
UN. In fact, even though the UN is an organization made up of national governments, and the
decisions it has to make must be the outcome of different governmental points of view, it is
strongly influenced by countries which contribute heavily to its financial support. A clear
example is the US, which contributes about two thirds of the UN budget. No decision taken
without the US's consent could be implemented. The US would not contribute the necessary
funds, and the resolutions to which it objected would remain on paper. Economic power has
an absolute veto and all other benevolent forces only have a secondary voice.
Whilst it is true that there are certain conditions which distinguish all democracies, it is
also true that there is no single model which fits all democracies. Certainly, French democracy
differs from British democracy and both democracies differ from American democracy. There
can be no democracy which can exist unmodified in two or more different cultural
communities. In other words, democracy is fIrst theoretical, and when it comes to practice,
some features have to change or give place to others. The assumption that a model of
democracy could be reproduced elsewhere unmodified was frequently made when the UN
wanted its policies to apply to the countries of the Third World, among them Rwanda.
Projects were conceived, planned and fInanced, and experts were sent into a little known
environment in order to implement these projects. The scenario turned out to be, in most but
not all cases, less of help for local people and more a new experiment for UN experts.
Trapped in a declining fInancial situation circumstances,post-independence Rwanda
had little room to defy the countries on which it depended economically and decide its own
destiny. Just as it is very diffIcult for an individual to make his own absolutely independent
decisions, without distancing himself from society, so it is almost impossible for a small
country to act independently of opinion in the international community. In every country,
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there must be a degree of consideration given to international opinion, as well as a larger
degree to the local situation and culture.
It was not by mistake that in his Social Contract (1946) Rousseau recognized the
influence of society upon every single person. For him, every man or woman is shaped by the
society in which slhe was brought up. When the society does not allow different individuals to
develop into fully adult, decision-making people, in other words when the senior members of
the society do not want the junior members of the same society to grow bigger and join them
on the same level, then the full humanity of these indIviduals is denied.
The same evil occurs when powerful countries do not allow developing countries to
become fully autonomous, but want them to remain satellites, in Frank's words. Writing about
Dependency Theory, Frank divides the economic world into two parts: the metropolis, which
forms the block of the rich and industrialized countries and the satellites, his term for the poor
and developing countries. In the works of other authors such as Samir Amin, the terms
'centre' and 'periphery' respectively express the same idea. Frank believes that a satellite
nation cannot develop itself because "metropolis exploits satellite, surplus is concentrated in
metropolis and the satellite is cut off from the capital investment funds, so its growth is
slowed down" (quoted in Brewer 1990, Marxist Theories ofImperialism, p 164). According to
Frank, satellite countries cannot help themselves, not because they do not want to, but because
they are restricted by the activities of the metropolis. Metropolitan countries develop
themselves at the expense of the satellite countries. Though this need not be entirely true, it
reflects what Amin had called "Africa of the labour reserves" in his article
'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa~ Origins and Contemporary Forms'
(Journal of Modern African Studies, 10, 4 (1972), pp. 503-24). And Amin believes, perhaps
pessimistically, that this labour supply will never dry up. "The development of capitalism in
the periphery is blocked by the superior competitive strength of the industries of the centre,
manifested in an ability to undercut the industries of the periphery or to establish a price level
which prevents new industries emerging at all" (Brewer 1980: 189). This environment, hostile
to development outside the metropolis, prevails in the international community and especially
in rich western countries, and is sometimes expressed in such a way that prevents
understanding of the whole position. Financial aid from a rich country to poor countries
becomes the means of further exploitation for the rich country.
In the 1990s, the Rwandan government wanted to improve its agricultural production,
for it believed that the economy of the country should rest on this basis. Several western
countries and organizations offered to help, including the United States through USAID. The
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big mistake was to copy exactly what was happening on American farms and to try· to
implement it in the mountains of Rwanda. Those experts in agronomy, who returned home
with a big part of their investment, failed to reconcile their techniques with the geographical
sit~ation of Rwanda. As a result, rather than helping the improvement of agricultural
production, the outcome of their techniques and chemical fertilizers encouraged uncontrolled
erosion and impoverishment of the soil. The return to natural fertilizers occurred too late. The
incident may have furthered the researches of American 'experts' and provided a market for
their fertilizers, but it failed to improve agricultural production in Rwanda. What followed
showed that the researchers had no sustained interest in the success of the project.
This was also the case when the French government, concerned to force the Belgians
to withdraw from Rwanda, offered a significant amount of money to the Rwandan
government in order to reform education to meet, as they said, the needs of modern life. When
Rwanda was declared politically independent, it had remained highly influenced by and
dependent on the Belgian educational system. The result of the French-influenced reform,
which took effect in 1979, revealed itself to be rather more dramatic than helpful. More than
ten years later the Ministry of Education in Rwanda tried to reconsider its policies but the
damage was done.
Nonetheless, once the French came to Rwanda, they remained for a considerable
period. They greatly influenced and supported the Habyalimana regime, though the fact that
they were serving their own political or economic interests was not well known. And when
the war was declared by RPF against the Rwandan government, French troops were
occasionally on the battlefield to back the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR). This war
indeed, marked a new period of events in Rwanda where, in the period of peace negotiations,
the UN really got involved. At the start of the RPF attack from Uganda, the UN did all it
could to maintain at a very low level its involvement in solving the Rwandan conflict. Their
idea was that the UN should distance itself from the 'internal conflicts' of Africa. They
believed that Africans should take the responsibility for solving their own problems. This
situation, however, had been produced, at least in part, by forces outside Rwanda.
The Organization for African Unity (OAU) was the first international organisation to
intervene in the Rwandan crisis. (1992) The OAD agreed with the help of different African
countries to provide troops for the process of peacekeeping and the UN was to give the
military equipment and financial assistance. It was for this purpose that the "Groupe
d'Observation Militaire Neutre" (GOMN) was created and sent into Rwanda to facilitate a
cease-fire agreement between RPF and Rwandan government forces. GOMN, a small
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contingent, little known, and often omitted from the chronological list of events in Rwanda of
post-1990, succeeded only in creating an opportunity for the RPF to infiltrate the country. In
the meantime, while French troops were busy training the FAR and its new recruits, the US
Army was busy training RPF. Most of the RPF officers were trained in US and they had
served in Ugandan Army.
In Mamdani we read: "By the end of November 1990, many RPF soldiers had been
killed and thousands were scattered by the counterassault of the Rwandan Army. About this
time, Major Paul Kagame interrupted his military training course in the United States and took
charge of the RPF" (Mamdani: 2001:186). This military training of RPF by US army has
continued until the present.
the first official UN intervention in the Rwandan situation was in consequence of the
Security Council resolution 872 in October 1993, which authorised the creation of United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). This was to facilitate the
implementation of the Peace Accords of Arusha, signed between RPF and the Rwandan
government. The formation of this group however, was weakened by the failure of the USA
intervention in Somalia some days in early October 1993. During this intervention, the USA
Army lost some of its elite soldiers and several others were wounded. The USA was not going
to risk another humiliation again in Africa. In terms of the Arusha Peace Accords, during the
establishment and functioning of a transitional government, there had to be power sharing
between the different political parties, including RPF, the fusion of the two armies (FAR and
RPF) and the demilitarization of the city of Kigali. Besides these conditions, 600 RPF soldiers
were to come to Kigali and stay in "Conseil National pour le Developpement" (CND) in
order to provide protection for their leaders who had to participate in the new transitional
government. With the demilitarization of Kigali, the only troops that were allowed to carry
arms were the Blue Helmets. Secretly, however, the RPF soldiers brought all their military
equipment into Kigali, as was later revealed when the war was re-launched after the
assassination of Habyalimana. The demilitarization of Kigali under UNAMIR control did not
stop RPF from planting of missile-launchers in the neighbourhood of the Kigali airport, a zone
controlled by the Belgian Blue Helmets. Some people, among whom were the Presidential
Guards, believed that these Belgian Blue Helmets were involved in planting those missile-
launchers or at least that they were complicitous with the RPF. It was this suspicion that
prompted the Presidential Guards to attack the Belgians, an attack in which some Belgians
were shot dead.
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When the Rwandan crisis was at its height, it was proposed by RPF that the number of
Blue Helmets and amount of military equipment be increased in order to stop the killing. But
the RPF with its supporters convinced UN Security Council that the UN intervention was not
necessary to stop the killings, because RPF was handling the situation. The reaction of UN
was to reduce the small number of UN troops that was there (Melvern 2000). Only after
hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were massacred while the UN contingent stood by,
despite its capacity to intervene, and only when the RPF had declared the end of war and the
formation of the new government, did President Clinton announced the 'American Aid Plan'
for Rwanda. Two weeks later, after the end of the war, the first contingent of US soldiers
arrived in Kigali in July 1994. This American Aid plan, called "Operation Hope," wasperhaps
a response to the French intervention with the "Operation Turquoise" because soon after the
arrival of the American soldiers, the French left the security zone they had created in the
western part of Rwanda. It was suggested by francophone Rwandans that this was a victory of
the English language over the French language. In fact, soon after the RPF came to power,
Tutsi French-speakers from Rwanda and Burundi saw themselves ridiculed and
disadvantaged. Nepotism was becoming obvious amongst the English-speakers, the majority
of whom were from Uganda. The appointment to high positions in government and
administration also appeared to depend on the power to speak English. In state offices,
English-speakers were first to be served.
Within the same year, 1994, and with the official goodwill of the RPF government, the
UN created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) with the mandate to
prosecute the perpetrators of genocide.
Did the UN-created judicial system, the ICTR, established after the end of war in
Rwanda, to prosecute human rights violators and 'genocidaires,' operate in good faith, or was
it also complicitous with the ruling powers? The sole purpose of the ICTR was and is the
prosecution of those responsible for genocide and other violations of international law in the
period between 1st January to 31st December 1994. (Resolution 955, 1994,
(hrtp://www.ictr.org )
The resolution which established the ICTR and which was passed on 8th November
1994 was a sign that United Nations was ready to cooperate with the new RPF government.
What was going to follow as justice, in Mamdani's words, was a 'victor's justice.' Such
'justice' implies that the victor is never considered as violator or potential violator of human
rights, even when there is clear evidence of this. We will come back to the functioning of the
ICTR later.
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Government officials and party leaders in Rwanda, RPF leaders and UN peace-keeping
forces who could have intervened to stop killings from happening, whether by military means
or by political strategies, intervened only when it was too late. They arrived together at the
same time as the humanitarian organizations that were to provide food for refugees and those
left destitute. Since UN is committed to curative rather preventative interventions, the
tendency is for such interventions to occur too late to serve the good of the victims, though
they may increase the prestige of humanitarian organizations.
The UN and other western countries' support for the new regime in Kigali showed
them to be concerned with their own prestige, as well as with the dispensation of 'justice' in
Rwanda. The UN seems to have felt that it had fallen short of its obligations in Rwanda and
believed that if it repaired the damage already done, it might remove the moral guilt that RPF
had succeeded in creating throughout the world. RPF had reproached the international
community with ignoring genocide, even though it was also RPF who had assured the UN that
intervention was unnecessary. It is possible, of course, that the international community was
too pleased to be assured that it need play no role in Rwanda.
The hostility of the new Kigali government to the French Government influenced
France to withdraw from Rwanda in 1994. Meanwhile, the British Government took the
opportunity, in collaboration with the English-speakers in Rwanda, to strengthen its presence
in Rwanda. It provided about eighty percent of school equipment as well as equipment needed
to rebuild the educational system. The question was raised as to whether English should
totally replace French in the educational system and become the only official language. This
replacement was revealed as impossible, given the consequences that would result from such
a sudden change. It was decided instead to maintain both languages, English and French, and
to make sure that the new graduates were bilingual. In primary schools, English and French
were to be taught at an earlier stage, and in secondary schools, those languages were also
emphasized, to ensure that student candidates for tertiary studies were capable of following
lectures in both English and French. For students who had completed their secondary
education and were entering the university with the knowledge of one of the two languages,
one year of languages was introduced to prepare students for university studies. The irony is
that while French-speakers were obliged to le.am English, English-speakers - mainly from
Uganda, who were opposed to learning French, preferred to go back to Ugandan Universities.
Nowadays the situation has more or less stabilized.
While the British were busy with the educational system, Americans also entered the
field, a little late, by building and supporting some tertiary institutions. When other countries
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such as South Africa were supplying the Rwandan Government with arms, (this can be proved
to have taken place in 1998, during the second DRC rebellion) the US was busy training,
supplying and supporting the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).
Several governments such as the USA and South Africa sold military equipment and
training to Rwanda during 1996 and 1997, apparently with little regard for the human rights
record of the RPF controlled Rwandan securiJY forces. The US army, in particular, has been
involved in a training programme for the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). Despite being one
of Rwanda's closest political and military allies, capable of exerting pressure for positive
changes in the human rights situation, the US government is not known to have publicly
condemned or demanded an end to persistent human rights violations in Rwanda.
(http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/printJAFR470371997?OpenDocument)
It appears from different sources, nevertheless, that the US government had access to all .
possible information concerning Rwanda. Why then, as the Amnesty International Report
makes clear, is the U.S Government not concerned about the human rights? What American
interest is believed to be served by silence on human rights? While preaching respect for
human rights and dignity, the "international community has allowed death to become a
banality in Rwanda once again". (Ibid) Amnesty International continues to ask the
international community and the US in particular to listen to its plea: "The USA and other
influential governments must publicly denounce the continuing killings and demand action
which will put an end to the violence directed at unarmed civilians". (Ibid) The irony·is that
while the international community is claiming to end random killings by instituting the ICTR,
killing continues unchecked and is even supported by the UN and ICTR. If only the
vanquished are to be punished for their misdeeds, as was the case in post~war Germany, then
justice is not served. Despite their widely disseminated propaganda, the victors are aware that
they cannot be believed by anybody but a fool. When it is revealed that genocide has occurred
on both sides, the plea is: because we can do nothing about the past, let us forget it and
concentrate on the future. The same mistakes continue to be made: there is no equality
between the two groups; and there is no attempt to dispense equal justice to all. "Still
burdened by guilt over the genocide, the international community ignored [and still ignores]
reports of abuses and supported the Rwandan government generously, hoping to achieve
stability in the region". (http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-08.htm)
When massacres were happening in Rwanda in 1994, no one wanted to say a .word.
Those who were really concerned, and perhaps wanted to intervene, feared that no one was
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r~ady to listen to them; they therefore had very little influence on the situation. Those in
power, it seems, had things just the way they wanted them and silence was the most advisable
policy. But soon afteFthe genocide of 1994 was over, they were willing to condemn what had
happened. It seems likely that they are waiting to condemn the Rwandan Government when
the killings which it is perpetrating inside Rwanda, in the DRC and in some other places, is
over. The media records progress on the battlefield, ignoring the fact that such progress does
not necessarily lead to an end of civilian casualties.
The UN Human Rights Commission showed even less concern than the Security
Council for such combat-related abuses (2000). Both the commission and the special
representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michel Moussalli, commended
the Rwandan Government for its progress, ignoring its abuses in the DRC and minimized
those inside Rwanda. (http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/Africa/rwanda3.html)
The European Union (EU) showed the same indifference to what was happening. "The
EU and its member states said little about Rwandan human rights abuses and contributed
generously to government funds". (!bid) While Rwanda is actually viewed as the centre of
conflict in the region of the Great Lakes, the Western countries do not withdraw their aid to
the Rwandan government, but rather continue to empower it by all means, as if they want to
encourage it to do more harm. The US not only supports the Rwandan government by
donations but it also does so by cancelling Rwandan debts so as to make the contribution
significant.
Generally viewed as strongly supportive of the Rwandan government, the US this year
helped it acquire the only advanced military radar system in central Africa and cut the
Rwandan debt to the US by 67 percent. It has also signed three grants totaling US. $15.1
million for assistance in establishing the rule of law, transparence in governance, and health
and social services. (http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1africa/rwanda3.html)
Since in the world at large the strong are justified by their strength alone, human rights
can only be respected if the strong are virtuous and self-critical; this does not seem likely to
be. Strength always tends to be opposed to humility and virtue. As long as the US continues to
support Rwanda in its human rights violations, there will always be victims in the Great Lakes
regIOn.
The US was widely seen as a key supporter of the Rwandan
government. In July [2001] Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Susan Rice, reacted against this characterization of US policy,
insisting that US showed no favour for Rwanda in the DRC war. The
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US did attempt to bring all parties to the war to a settlement, but its
continued military training programs for Rwandan soldiers, like the
absence of firm, explicit condemnation of abuses in the DRC and in
Rwanda indicated continued important support for the Rwandan
government. (http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-08.htm)
With this US support, and given the influence of the US in the UN, it is quite easy to
understand the policies of UN vis-a-vis Rwanda. After all, it is not very different from the US
position. It is in this atmosphere that the ICTR was created, an atmosphere of victor and
vanquished, similar to that of the period when the US and its allies were victors in the Second
WorId War. With the institution of the ICTR, though one cannot argue that it was not
necessary, the UN left little room for Rwandans to consider different ways of achieving
justice and reconciliation. Victors' justice was handed out, with no sense of the reality, that
Rwandans would have to live with one another. Tutu says about South Africans, "While the
Allies could pack up and go home after Nuremberg, we in South Africa had to live with one
another" (Tutu 1999: 25). The same words may be said for Rwanda: "We in Rwanda will
have to live with one another". But with the victors' justice practiced by ICTR and the judicial
system in Rwanda, this 'living together, ' if it implies peaceful coexistence, has little chance
of taking place. Like the Belgians before the 1959 revolution, the UN has created a division
amongst Rwandans by imposing a kind of solution that did not take into account all the
factors. (http://www.ictr.orgl)
As we have said, the UN created the ICTR in response to an official request by the
Rwandan Government to the UN Security Council to institute an International Judiciary that
would prosecute the perpetrators of genocide. The government at that period was said to
represent all parties and to desire national unity. In instituting the ICTR, the aim, the UN
wants us to believe, was to contribute to national reconciliation and to the restoration and
maintenance of peace. In resolution 1165 (1998) we read that the UN
remain[s] convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda,
the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of
International Humanitarian Law will contribute to the process of
National reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of
peace in Rwanda and in the region [... ] (http://www.ictr.orgO
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The only judicial process that can contribute to national reconciliation and to the restoration
and maintenance of peace is prosecution, irrespective of the group affiliations of the accused.
In a case like that of Rwanda, this prosecution must be, from its inception, the outcome of a
co~sensus between the parties in conflict. Such prosecution could follow, for instance, the
model of the Arusha Accords. The reason why it is necessary to insist on consensus from the
inception is that it is unlikely to be fair if it is instituted by one side, especially by the victor.
The vanquished are likely to feel that they are accused, not because of their guilt, even when it
is the case, but because they have lost the armed struggle.
There might be cases in which the only perpetrator of crime is the vanquished, and as a
result members of that group form the only party prosecuted. In this case a fair trial is likely,
even if the prosecuted does not believe this. The critical case is when the perpetrators are the
victors. Obviously they will not institute a criminal tribunal to prosecute themselves. Neither
will the vanquished be able to institute a criminal tribunal to prosecute the victors. In both
cases then the victor, though criminal, is not prosecuted. Where is the justice in all this? A
third case which combines both sides mentioned above, the case that can be said to be in
between, occurs when both victor and vanquished are accused of crime, as in the case of
Rwanda. In this case there are five possibilities for instituting the criminal tribunal:
1) The criminal tribunal might be instituted only by the UN without any contribution from
the parties in conflict. This would be an international commitment to prosecute human rights
violators, regardless of their origin or political affiliation or whether they are state officials or
not. This case however will encounter difficulties because the UN only has rights to intervene
in a country that is one of its members. As Rwanda will be represented in the General
Assembly, any attempt to prosecute state officials would certainly be opposed by its
representative. Nevertheless the influence of this representative will depend on how close his
country is to the most influential countries in the UN.
2) The Criminal Tribunal might be instituted by the victor together with the UN, as in the
case of Rwanda. If the UN is not really on the victor's side, then a fair hearing is likely to
occur, though with difficulties because the investigation of the victor's side would demand a
firm commitment from the UN. But when the UN is on the victor's side, it is unlikely that
justice will be done. The Rwandan case illustrates very well the situation as we read it in
Human Rights Watch Report 2001.
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In November 1999, the Appeals Chamber ordered the release of Jean-
Bosco Barayagwiza on the grounds of procedural errors by the
prosecution. The Rwandan Government immediately suspended
cooperation with the court and for a brief period refused a visa to the
chief prosecutor. In early 2000, the Appeals Chamber reheard the case.
The prosecutor argued for reversal on legal grounds but also stated
that prosecutions for genocide could not continue without cooperation
from the Rwandan government. The Appeals Chamber reversed its
decision, allowing Barayagwiza to be tried. In late 1999, the tribunal
decided to receive an official and permanent representative of the
Rwandan government, and in 2000, judges of the chamber visited
Rwanda where they were received by president Kagame. These
developments together with the absence of any prosecutions of RPF
members for alleged crimes raised questions about the impartiality of
the tribunal. [My italics]
(http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/africalrwanda3.html)
This example is typical. When the question of understanding genocide was raised, the
assassination of Habyalimana was seen as the crucial event that might even be the real cause
of genocide. To find out about who was responsible for this assassination would be a point of
departure for any impartial understanding and fair justice. Several experts investigated the
case and some reports were submitted to some of the UN representatives. Because the missiles
used were found to be of French origin, the French also were among the investigators. We can
recall here that Habyalimana's pilots were also French. During the French inquiry, evidence
emerged that the missiles used in the attack had been confiscated in Iraq by the American
military during Persian Gulf War. When evidence was collected in a report submitted to a
Canadian ex-prosecutor of ICTR, Judge Louise Arbour, and two ex-RPF soldiers-who were
involved in the assassination-were ready to testify, Judge Arbour preferred to cancel the case
on the grounds that it was not the mandate of ICTR to investigate RPF. However, whether
they want it or not, the article of Steven Edwards in National Post, Canada of January the 3rd
2000 has made a point and the credibility of UN and ICTR was since shaken.
(This and other information about Habyalimana's death may be found in Rwanda 2000, on
www.geocities.com/iwacu.geo/morthabyara.htm). If then, as Judge Arbour said, the mandate
of ICTR is not to investigate the RPF, this seems to imply that any murders committed as a
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matter of RPF policy, and in obedience to instlUctions from authorities are exempt from
prosecution. Such a decision seems to render the punishment of genocide, at least on the side
of the victors, impossible.
3) The Criminal Tribunal might be instituted by victor and vanquished alone. This case
has little chance of happening for it demands that the victor recognize, consider and accept the
equal rights of the vanquished. But if ever this happens it is more likely to bring hope for
peaceful coexistence because both sides will have made it clear that they are committed to
peace and unity.
4) The Criminal Tribunal might be instituted by the victor and the vanquished together
with the support of UN. This is also a case that could bring hope of unity, and seems to have
more chance than the third case. This is because under the UN's watchful eye, the victor finds
it easier to acknowledge and admit his or her responsibility. In this case, the responsibility is
left to both victor and vanquished and the UN only intervenes as mediator, facilitator or
provider of necessary means in order to bring about justice and reconciliation.
5) The victor alone might institute the Criminal Tribunal. This is more likely to become
the justice of dictatorship, for the victor is the only master of the field. The victor has the
decision on who is to be tried, how he or she is to be tried and which institution has to try him
or her. This is the case of the judiciary system in Rwanda where new judges-all the former
judges were either killed during the events of 1994 or removed by the new regime on the
grounds of complicity with the old regime of Habyalimana-are formed within the framework
of RPF ideology and are appointed and removed by government, according to the way in
which they respond to its policies and needs. Because of this, judges in Rwanda are not
independent but are controlled by political pressure, and therefore no lUle of Law can be said
to exist in Rwanda. This is why Lenta says: "The lUle of Law requires an independent
judiciary isolated from political pressures. This generally means that judges are not removable
from their posts" (Lenta 2001: 63). It is partly this lack of independence and proper training of
judges that worries observers when it comes to the fairness of the trials inside Rwanda. This is
also what we find in Amnesty International Index Report 1997.
The first trials of people charged with genocide and other crimes
against humanity in Rwanda have been largely unfair-with most
prosecutors and judges having little training, some trials lasting only a
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few hours, and an apparent assumption that defendants are guilty
unless proven innocent [... ]. Most prosecutors and judges have only
received up to six months' training, without any prior legal training
whatsoever. Despite the significant progress made in recent months to
rebuild the judicial system, the use of judicial officials not adequately
trained has seriously jeopardised the process and outcome of trials.
Furthermore, throughout 1995 and 1996, a number of judicial officials
have been removed from their posts, apparently as result of
government or military interference with their duties. Because he had
apparently denounced the interference of the authorities in the
functioning of the judiciary, Celestin Kayibanda, Prosecutor of Butare,
was arrested in May 1996, on charges of genocide. Reports of such
interference have continued this year.
(http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/AFR470131997)
When it is well known that the charge of genocide can be used by State officials for personal
and political ends, the major concern is that innocent people may be tried unfairly and
sentenced to death, as capital punishment is accepted by the Rwandan Constitution.
Amnesty International is unconditionally opposed to the use of the
death penalty, in all countries, because it is a state-sanctioned violation
of the right to life. In Rwanda, the situation is of special concern when
people may be sentence to death after unfair trials. (Ibid)
Human Rights Watch expresses the same concern by pointing out that even in cases where
innocence was made clear by evidence, witnesses are often harassed and reduced to silence.
In early May, the RPF publicly condemned survivors for falsely accusing others of
genocide, but failed to note that RPF leaders themselves also sometimes resorted to false
charges for their own ends. In some cases, survivors who spoke out against false accusations
or testimonies were harassed by other survivors,who wanted the accused persons condemned.
A witness at a trial in Butare declared in court that some persons, including judicial personnel,
had attempted to persuade him to give false testimony. Threatened immediately after with
arrest, the witness went into hiding. (http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/Africa-08.htm) Furthermore,
poorly trained prosecutors and judges and their inadequate numbers, together with the
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interference of government and the military, do not constitute the only obstacles to Rwandan
justice. The overwhelming number of prisoners who are awaiting trial for years and who often
are detained without records being kept, is a major threat, given the overcrowding in prisons.
This however does not stop security officers from bringing in more prisoners. Overwhelmed
by this large number, together with international pressure, and the knowledge that prisoners
are dying without trial, the government has instituted a communal justice called "gacaca",
which raises even more concern about fairness. This is a form of trial in which the neighbours
and acquaintances of an accused person pronounce on his/her innocence or guilt.
Throughout the year 2001, the government promised this alternative form of
communal justice, gacaca, but late in the year the necessary legislation had not been passed.
Although the programme offered some hope of trying the accused more rapidly, it raised
concerns about the rights of the accused, particularly because it provided no right to counsel.
Although no gacaca law existed, authorities implemented a kind of gacaca in many prisons,
at the direction of the Ministry of Justice. There was no public explanation of how these
sessions were conducted or what use would be made of their conclusions.
(http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/africa/rwanda.htm)
The judicial dilemma which the current Rwandan government is facing was also a
concern raised by Van Zyl: "No criminal justice system can function if as a result of a change
in power and policy arising from a political transition, it is suddenly required to prosecute tens
of thousands of crimes committed in the past"(Van Zyl 1999: 661). This was well known to
the UN when it instituted the ICTR. The UN knew how fast its judicial institutions would go
and how large would be the number of Rwandans that could be tried. Because it had all the
information, it knew that the Rwandan genocide was not a crime committed by government
only but a popular crime, where thousands of people were involved in human rights
violations. Nevertheless, it instituted a Criminal Tribunal to try those thousands, an institution
that risks being only symbolic, as well as divisive rather than reconciling. When it comes to
national reconciliation and peace-keeping, the United Nations also knew that criminal justice
must not be seen as the only means to achieve justice, especially when the aim was towards
reconciliation and peacekeeping. Maybe it is because it knew that the new RPF regime was no
different in terms of policy from the previous regime, and neither was it leading to democracy.
Neither the UN nor the Rwandan government sought a more appropriate or efficient approach.
Will ICTR be a reconciling organ or a divisive one? This question is worthy of being posed,
given the circumstances in which the ICTR was formed. The model of the Nuremberg. trials
was followed because as in that case, it was the victor who had only to pronounce the verdicts.
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The RPF regime had removed its predecessor by military means and asked the UN to put in
place a process that would prosecute the vanquished. The assumption was then, as was
mentioned above, thatonly the vanquished are criminals. As Marndani says, it is this 'victor's
justice' that is happening in Rwanda. (Mamdani 2000: 270) What would have happened if the
few surviving Jews had decided to remain in Germany and coexist with Nazi Germans just
after the Holocaust? Would the vanquished side feel really responsible? Will it not feel itself
always victimized by the victor's justice under the UN umbrella? Will reconciliation take
place when the "tu quoque argument" still has a place? The problem with this argument, as
was said above, is that it does not leave room for both victor and vanquished to assume
responsibility for their actions. The temptation is always to look at the other, and to say that
both sides are equally guilty and should therefore be prosecuted. Even the prosecutor may be
conceived of as a potential or obvious violator of human rights, prosecuting others for the
crimes she or he has also committed. The only way to avoid this problem, though the 'tu
quoque' argument does not excuse anyone, is to bring to justice all suspected violators of
human rights.
It is clear that the ICTR, though officially aiming at reconciliation and peace, cannot
achieve its goal, since it was created as a result of the negotiation between the victorious party
in the Rwandan conflict together with the UN, but excluded another major party. Though we
do not know yet the real intention of the UN in wanting to intervene as a mediator, it was
expected to take the places both of mediator and of champion of the vanquished.
The ICTR, unlike the TRC, has taken a side. It represents, in fact, what South Africa has
avoided by instituting the TRC. Needless to say, given the Rwandan case, there is no
possibility of reproducing a South African-type TRC within the country, partly because
Rwanda is a case of genocide on a far larger scale than occurred in South Africa, and partly
because Rwanda is still in a pre-transitional period. In this period, there can be no impartial
attempt to adopt the South African model before a transitional regime has followed the current
regime. Even in that case, it is not obvious that South Africa would be an ideal model. Sooner
or later, this transitional regime will be needed because the judicial system, both local and
imported from the outside (ICTR), will reveal itself incapable of dealing with all cases. Both
the UN and the present Rwandan regime will realize that the possibilities of peace and
reconciliation depend heavily on how the various sides in the conflict articulate the terms of a
possible solution and define the issues which at present prevent reconciliation.
(http://www.ijr.org.co.za/africpro.htm ) The involvement of all parties in Rwanda is crucial:
any solution must be the result of all parties in the conflict being willing to abandon the
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antagonisms of the past. If this does not occur, when the victor of today becomes the
vanquished of tomorrow, the cycle of murders will begin again.
Given the nature and extent of the Rwandan genocide, it is likely that any judicial process
which addresses the wrongs of the past will involve retributive justice. However, peace will
be the main target. And this peace will have to relate to Lyotard's definition: a justice of a
plurality and a plurality of justice.
Is there any alternative capable of filling the gap created by the UN, which has failed
to find the conditions for peace and reconciliation, or even for retributive justice to both sides
in Rwanda? What kind of language game does the Rwandan case require?
86
IV
Possibilities for transitional justice in Rwanda
So far what we have been trying to do is to delineate a clear picture of the Rwandan
situation in order to devise an appropriate approach to transitional justice. First we have
defined transitional justice as justice that "has to do with a situation in which a previously
authoritarian regime has given way to a democratic one, and the new democracy is faced with
the problem of how to address the human rights abuses of its predecessor"
(http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02/ ).
Transitional justice will differ from one case to another, according to the different needs of
each case. The specificity of each case is important, and it may be that the differences are such
that no precedents can be used. Possible models are:
(1) Amnesia, where the main concern is just to forget about the past and to totally concentrate
on the future;
(2) Selective Punishment, where only a few principal figures of the previous and abusive
regime are brought to justice;
(3) Historical clarification, where the main concern is remembering. The problem in each
case is to clarify whatever is possible, without identifying prematurely the individuals who
can be held responsible. Since these individuals remain unknown, prosecution is
impossible.
(4) Mixed memory and punishment. With this model, remembering alone is not enough; it
does not exclude punishment, because here the individuals responsible for human rights
abuses are specified. It follows that punishment is possible though it is not the primary
objective.
The case of Rwanda requires a different approach. What is special in the case of Rwanda is
the extent of the genocide and, as has been indicated, the fact that the nation is not yet in a
transitional phase. Any attempt devise a mode of transitional justice for Rwanda is unlikely to
be descriptive of what is happening there, but rather prophetic of what might and should be
there in the future.
According to Mamdani, the Rwandan crisis is a political crisis and any attempt to
solve the conflict will require a political approach, in that political refonn that will take into
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account the past genocide, its causes, and its consequences will be necessary. Political reform
after the genocide will need to relate to three salient features of the Rwandan situation: first,
its starting point, the genocide; second, the consequence of genocide, a tension-ridden polity;
and third, the fact that these consequences have overflowed the boundaries of Rwanda,
making it the epicentre of the crisis of the Great Lakes area. (Mamdani 2001: 265).
Mamdani believes that with the genocide, HutuITutsi relations have seriously, perhaps fatally,
deteriorated. The tensions between these two ethnic groups are volcanic in nature and to
"contain these tensions will not only require a drown-out cooling-off period and an approach
that puts reform in Rwanda in the context of a regional reform agenda; it will also require a
commitment and a responsibility that is international, not just regional" (Ibid.). However,
whatever solution Rwanda opts for, either by following the examples set by Israel or South
Africa, or simply by finding a new and particular model, Mamdani contends that Rwanda will
have one basic choice to make, the choice "between political union [between its two major
groups] and political divorce" (Ibid.).
Recognizing the value of Mamdani's point, we understand that the Rwanda crisis is
not only a political crisis. The genocide has spilled over political boundaries. The crisis has
affected any relationship that might exist between Hutu and Tutsi. The healing, which is the
great challenge facing the nation and its leaders, must not be forced, but has to happen
naturally, however consciously, letting 'time to take its time' and taking into account human
capabilities. To accept Mamdani' s ideas would be to suppose that at the end of what is known
.as the 1994 genocide, all armed conflict stopped. But this is far from being the reality. The
armed struggle carried on, and remains a threat to any political solution that may be brought
forward. Any attempt to address the crisis of Rwanda must start by putting an end to the
armed struggle. War must stop in Rwanda and in its neighbouring countries. When the RPF
seized power in 1994, the war did not stop inside the country. Not only has the vanquished
army continued to launch several attacks but the new government hunts the 'genocidaires'
inside and outside the Rwandan borders. That is one of the reasons why the RPF troops
crossed the borders into the DRC, as did the Rwandan refugees, together with the vanquished
army, a little earlier. It can be argued that the conflicts of Rwanda have contaminated the
DRC and here too war must end. In Burundi, the twin country of Rwanda, problems are more
or less the same as in Rwanda. Political and social chaos has lasted for several years and the
conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi has intensified along with the Rwandan conflict.
And as long as the war between the rebels and the Burundian government forces does not end
and find a peaceful solution, Rwanda is unlikely to achieve stability. Uganda, where the
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Rwandan crisis had its origins, does not have peace either. Rebels from the north are still
armed, and Rwandans who were deceived by the new regime while they fought for the RPF
are going back to Uganda. This situation, together with the conflict in the DRC, where
Ugandan and Rwandan troops from time to time confront one another, put the peace of the
region in jeopardy.
The end of war would produce a turning point where political power is no longer
associated with military power and where the community of the Great Lakes area and of
Rwanda in particular would no longer be understood as auto-destructive but rather as an auto-
constructive community. The end of warfare would mean that the armed and oppositional
forces renounced war and ceased to attack government forces inside Rwanda, and engaged
only in political struggle. The end of war in the DRC would mean that the Rwandan
government recognized that it has no right to maintain a military presence on Congolese soil.
It would mean that the Rwandan government understood and recognized the rights and dignity
of the Congolese people, which must not be sacrificed to the interests of Rwandan security.
This would mean that Rwandans and Congolese understand that conflicts cannot be solved by
arms, but by working together towards a consensus that would serve the common good of all.
War offers no solution to these problems, and can only create a vicious circle of victor and
vanquished. This was what Tutu implied with his imagery of "top dog" and "underdog":
It has already been demonstrated that the history of Rwanda is a
typical story of "top dog" and "underdog". The top dog wanted to
cling to its privileged position and the underdog strove to topple the
top dog. When that happened, the new top dog engaged in an orgy of
retribution to pay back the new underdog for all the pain and suffering
it had caused when it was top dog. The new underdog fought to topple
the new top dog, storing in its memory all the pain and suffering it was
enduring, and forgetting that the new top dog was, in its view, only
retaliating for all that it remembered it had suffered. It was a sad
history of reprisal provoking a counter-reprisal. I reminded the Tutsi
that they had waited for thirty years to get their own back for what
they perceived to be the injustices that had been heaped on them. I
said that extremists among the Hutu were also quite capable of waiting
thirty years or more for the day when they could topple the new
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government, arid in their turn unleash the devastation of revenge and
resentment (Tutu 1999: 208).
Another reason why war must end before any solution can be found for the Rwandan
crisis is that since the political leaders who would be involved in negotiating are also military
leaders, they would find it difficult to concentrate on peace and reconciliation while
maintaining their responsibility for the defense of the regime internally and externally. The
end of war would mean that the international community, especially those nations involved in
the arms trade, has finally understood that the Rwandan crisis cannot contribute to their
economic prosperity through the buying and selling of weapons. Rich nations may no longer
profit by granting loans, which will be paid back at high interest. The establishment of peace
would also imply that everyone has understood that life is so precious that it has to be
defended and protected before any other interests, no matter who the person is to be protected.
The end of war would mean that the international community is finally willing to break the
circle of "top dog" and "underdog" and want to find a more humane manner of dealing with
problems.
How this war will be brought to an end depends, not only on the commitment of the
parties in the conflict to peace, but also on the international community, and especially on the
willingness of the USA to change its policies in Rwanda. To ignore the role that it is playing
in Rwanda, either in politics, the economy or military affairs, would be to misunderstand the
entire reality. To believe that any problem in which the USA is involved can be solved
without the consent of that superpower would be to overestimate the strength of other agents
involved in the same problem. This is not to say that the Rwandan crisis is only the
responsibility of the Americans, but that any move towards a solution depends crucially on
American goodwill. It is worth recalling the role that the international community, especially
the UN and the US, has played in the history of the Rwandan crisis; a crisis that was
exacerbated, and shaped under colonial rule and which has since appeared the crucial force in
Rwandan history. The deterioration of HutufTutsi relationships started when Tutsi, profiting
from their position of power, neglected the Hutu, subjugated them and oppressed them till the
Hutu started losing even what they had.
The inter-group antagonism of Hutu and Tutsi continued after the revolution of 1959
and increased with the genocide of 1994. Again the UN failed to fulfill its role of peace-
keeper around the world, nor did it prevent human rights violations. It has preferred to support
a minority group, committed to serving the interests of one warring section of the population,
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and to re-emphasise the differences that have not disappeared from the minds of Rwandans.
This double victimization of the Rwandan people by the UN, this change of positions,
supporting the majority against the minority today, and the minority against the majority
tomorrow, seems to have gone unobserved by the historians and analysts who are interested in
Rwandan history. It is because the UN has played a vital role in increasing the gravity of the
Rwandan crisis that the solution will have to involve the same organ, the UN. The role that the
US has played does not need to be debated at length, given the influence that they have n the
UN. The US involvement is also dealt with in a previous chapter and can be referred to if
needed.
Only when armed conflict has come to an end can the political phase commence. Then
Rwandans will have to make the choice outlined by Mamdani: a choice between political
union and political divorce. This choice becomes much easier if one considers the options,
because political divorce might only bring back armed struggle. The choice of political union
would not mean that all political ideologies were transformed and fused into one ideology,
reducing diversity to singularity and political uniformity. What is desirable is rather a plurality
of opinions, where different political ideologies, through different political parties, are
brought together to compete with each other in a peaceful and democratic manner for the good
of all the people. This would mean that the Rwandan people were willing to break out of the
cycle of injustice that has characterized their history and to make their way into a better world,
where the dignity of every person is respected. This change will be a great challenge,
demanding that Rwandans face the entire truth without fear of being found guilty or
victimised. This facing of the truth is important in order that the country may not again prove
the truth of Santayana's words that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it. Rwandans must not remember the past in any distorted or partial manner, but so that
everyone recognizes his/her responsibility. For Rwanda, remembering can only be effective if
it admits and faces all the historical injustices of Rwandan history and the Rwandan people,
and clarifies all the consequences. Everyone must understand that the problems were not
unavoidable and that there is a way of being and living together despite differences. This
remembering of the past in facing the truth is what Mamdani calls "reconciliation with
history" (Mamdani 2001: 266).
As the overview of the occurrences and reasons for genocide has shown, the conflict
between Hutu and Tutsi was a conflict between slave and master, between powerholder and
oppressed. Before colonialism formalised and rigidified these relations, the powerholders
were unopposed, because what was important for the primitive community was its survival.
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L~ter, when power became increasingly the means of supplying complex economic desires, it
was perceived, justly, as increasing the economic distance between groups. At this point, the
power struggle became an economic struggle. With colonialism, the relationship between
Tutsi and Hutu became the struggle of oppressor and oppressed. In present-day Rwanda this
power struggle between the oppressed and the oppressor has finally embraced their entire
being, because they believe it to be the only means of survival. Moreover, each side in the
conflict believes that the two cannot coexist. Survival equals victory and there cannot be two
victors at the same time when there are two opposing parties. Any attempt at reconciliation,
including reconciliation with history, must recognize this belief that power equals survival.
Mamdani says, "there can be no reconciliation without a reorganization of power" (Ibid: 268).
Once this power struggle is recognized, a new way of opposing each other, without
armed struggle, must be found. Another way of reconciling with history will be the
recognition that no one was innocent, and everyone was responsible. In fact, for Tutsi to
believe that Hutu are monsters who are dedicated to killing Tutsi, or for Hutu to believe that
Tutsi cannot be Tutsi without oppressing Hutu will serve nothing except to perpetrate the
circle of violence. Tutsi will have to recognize and accept that their ancestors have taken
advantage of history to oppress Hutu before and during colonialism. It may be argued that
before colonialism the Hutu did not complain, but this cannot be an excuse or a confirmation
that it was the right thing to do. The Hutu also will have to recognize and acknowledge that
they have made the same mistake after the 1959 revolution by oppressing the Tutsi in their
turn. They will have to accept that they started the cycle of revenge, because when they
overcame their oppressors they retaliated. They failed to reorganize the society, or Hutu/Tutsi
relationships, in a more humane and hmIDonious manner. If this retaliation had not taken
place, the Tutsi might have felt less anger and enmity. Maybe they should have considered
that the Hutu did not topple them by revolution in order to exclude them from the political
arena and especially from Rwandan history. If this has been the choice, the idea of being
'born-to-rule' that for years was branded in their minds could have been tempered. This would
have decreased the post-revolution attacks of Inyenzi and neither Hutu and Tutsi would have
become extreme and polarised. In the present circumstances, the challenge is to face the
consequences in a constructive way, that is, to accept what is real in order to deal with it
adequately.
Now that the events of 1994 have made Rwandan history unique, Rwanda is once
again at a crossroads of its history. It is because of the uniqueness of the genocide which
occurred and its role in current relationships between Rwandans that special attention will be
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focused on it, so as to suggest how to deal with its consequences. But before dealing with the
consequences, Rwandan people will first have to face it together and to acknowledge its
whole truth. This facing the whole truth of genocide, this appreciation of its gravity, will
require all groups involved to be honest first with themselves, second, with historical events,
and third, with all other parties in the conflict. They have to be honest with themselves
because it is here that everything starts. This would mean that they examine their own
attitudes and their role in the conflict, and recognize and accept their responsibility; they must
have the will to accept the consequences of their actions and to change. This requires them to
stop blaming others and considering themselves as innocent or justified. They have to be
honest about historical events, so as to put "the truth of genocide, the truth of mass killings, in
a historical context" (Mamdani 2001: 268), in order to understand why and how this genocide
happened. Just as genocide has consequences, it was itself also a consequence of other events.
This chain of events must be freely discussed, otherwise the genocide will never be
understood and the truth will remain partially known.
If ever the mistake is made of letting the truth remain hidden, sooner or later it will
reveal itself and it may then be too late to prevent disaster. Rwandans must be willing to
reveal things as they are, without defending their own side, but acknowledging their own
wrongdoing. Given the cultural characteristic of fear of being publicly humiliated that we
have pointed out earlier, the acknowledgement of one's own wrongdoing is likely to be a
tough challenge, especially for the victors. Nevertheless, without this acknowledgement, there
is nothing that can be done to ensure a sustainable and peaceful coexistence. This being
honest with oneself, with the history and with the other parties involved in genocide, is similar
to the truth telling in South Africa in the processes of the TRC. It is only when the truth about
genocide is known that the Rwandan people as a whole can decide what to do next.
The next step will be to explore all the consequences of genocide. Genocide and its
consequences have in fact contaminated all the different facets of Rwandan life, social,
economical, emotional, and psychological. The most complicated dimension is perhaps the
psychological one. This dimension if neglected or dealt with carelessly might, unperceived,
influence the rest of the process. This would also add to the lack or loss of trust amongst
people from different ethnic groups, a trust that needs to be recovered, otherwise "co-
operation and a thriving life become difficult, if not impossible" (Daryl Koehn 1998: 81).
Because Rwandan people of different ethnic groups are condemned to live together, they have
to find a way to rebuild this trust for, according to Koehn, "trust is the unperceived ground of
many of our perceptions and actions" (Ibid.). Trust is a necessary condition for any social
93
interaction, economic growth or prosperity, to be possible. Trust implies honesty. If people
trust it is because first and foremost they are honest with themselves and with others in their
social relations and believe that others are also honest. Honesty with oneself and with others
i~plies admission of the truth. This value for truth implies what we have said above about
honesty with historical events. It is a kind of faithfulness to the events. Trust also implies a
kind of social justice or a justice in different social interactions. When people trust each other,
and, especially, each other's judgment, it is because they believe they will be treated fairly. If
belief in this social justice is one day revealed as mistaken, the trust is likely to cease to exist.
The assumption would be that because genocide happened once, it can happen again. This is
the case of Rwanda: the belief in social justice has been destroyed.
No one trusts the 'other' of another group; there is always a feeling that there might be
a hidden interest in the 'other' person especially when he or she is from another ethnic group.
Even people who take the risk of trusting again those who have deceived them do so with
reservations and reserves; there can be no absolute trust. That is why people who have never
been deceived are more disposed to trust than those who are deceived daily. Trust has
deteriorated in Rwandan people's relations with each other, especially during the killings
where an individual's special friend was the first to reveal to enemies where he was hiding.
However, the few that remained faithful to their friends from other groups were sometimes
judged on the grounds that if others from the same group could deceive, they were capable of
doing the same thing. They were not offered the opportunity to prove their behavioral
uniqueness. To reconstruct trust-which is necessary for the success of any society-in
Rwandan society will take a long time, maybe generations. That is why trust cannot be
considered an absolute or necessary condition for movement to the next step in the transitional
justice process. The commitment to movement towards trust is the minimum requirement
before entering any relationship.
Some may argue that contracts can replace trust. But the truth is that there is no
contract that can be agreed upon without a minimum of trust. Parties to a contract must
believe that what is written is really what is meant, and that there is no necessary information
that is being hidden by one partner before signing the contract, knowledge of which would
have hindered or prevented the agreement. This minimum belief in the other partner is the
minimum requirement of trust for any relationship or any contract to take place. When the
commitment to trust one another is there, Rwandans will be ready to move to the next step,
which, despite the example of Burundi, remains a big challenge. This step is the divorce
between group identity and political identity. This means that Rwandans will have to stop
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confusing political parties with other kinds of groups. The basis of a political party is its
ideology, its vision of how the country should be administered in order to prosper, for the sake
of all its citizens, and also for all mankind. To believe that this political ideology, this vision
of the country's administration, is shared only by members of one group, would be to
disbelieve in the rational humanity of the other group. Such a belief is a sign of intellectual
immaturity, which fails to distinguish between the material and spiritual, or a misconception
of a democratic system, where ideas and their authors are taken as identical. This is where
democracy changes into nepotism, where the ideas of the person known are always preferred
to the stranger's, even if they are not brilliant or better. If the idea remains that ethnic majority
means political majority and ethnic minority political minority, little progress is likely to be
made towards democracy. A clear example is that of Burundi. This country has more or less
the same problems as those in Rwanda and the idea that ethnic majority means political
majority, present in Rwanda, is also present in Burundi. When democratic elections were
organized in Burundi in 1993, the Front for Development of Burundi (FRODEBU), the
political majority, which was also an ethnic majority, won and Ndadaye, a Hutu, was to
become President. But the Tutsi, the political and ethnic minority, who, unfortunately for the
new democratic regime, held more than 90% of the posts in the National Army, did not see
the victory as a political but an ethnic one. And because they did not want their group to lose
power, their solution was to assassinate the new President. After the assassination, political
chaos ensued, which finally resulted in a coup. The former President, Major Pierre Buyoya,
who had lost the election, came back into power, claiming that he was the only guarantee for
the unity and stability of the country. So far nothing much has been done to improve the
situation. It makes sense to believe, with Mamdani (2001), that the solution to the crisis in
Burundi may serve as example to Rwandans. But if the recent attempt of the Arusha
Agreement between Burundians was to bring them together in order to overcome the
impediments to the solution of their crisis, this is unlikely to happen. No one seems to have
learnt from history or appears to know where the real problem lies. The solution proposed by
Nelson Mandela-the former South African President who was the. facilitator of the talks-
which was to consider a transitional period, in which a Hutu Vice-President would be elected,
with a Tutsi President, for the first period of eighteen months, and then the two are to
exchange roles for the following eighteen months period, was also based on the same mistake.
It too confused politics and ethnicity, and ethnic group with political party. Will this transition
lead to a sustainable democracy in Burundi? Let us hope so, for the sake of all Burundian
people.
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The mam reason why the same mistake was repeated appears to be the lack of
goodwill and trust that has characterized the leadership of Burundi, and the lack of
information about the ethnic crisis in the Great Lakes countries that characterized Mandela's
suggestions in the Arusha peace talks amongst the Burundian people. This is why, given the
similarities between Rwandan and Burundian problems, it is not advisable for Rwanda to
follow the same path that Burundi has taken. Rwanda should first abandon the ideology of
ethnic majority or minority to embrace and "forge a political majority" (Mamdani 2001: 287).
This could mean that "a way ha[s] to be found to put together a transitional majority" ( Ibid.)
which would transcend all the different ethnic groupings to give place to political groupings
or political parties in which all ethnic groups are represented. If this ideology of inclusion
succeeds in replacing the old, exclusive one, the transitional regime is likely to follow. As
soon as a political majority that transcends ethnic groups is formed, it will be perceived that
the requirements for transitional justice are still to be met. The next step will be the drafting of
a constitution, together with a judiciary system that will be capable of dealing with the
transitional regime with its problems of coping with past, present and future. This constitution
must keep alive in a humane manner the prospect of continuous social reform leading to
sustainable democracy.
It must ensure that in the new democracy the rule of law is a national concern. This
rule of law "requires an independent judiciary isolated from political pressures. This generally
means that judges are not removable from their posts. Even if judges were easily purged, it
might take years to train a qualified class of new lawyers and judges to replace them on the
bench". (Kritz 1995: xxv-xxvi in Lenta p 63) Given the case of Rwanda, where human rights
violations have become a reference point for all innovation, judges will have a key role to play
in the new democracy. That is why their training must be formalised and devised to meet all
the requirements. Robertson (1999/2000) contends that justice delayed is justice denied: it
should be added that justice denied is reconciliation rejected. This is not to say that justice, in
the sense of the prosecution of wrongdoers, is the necessary requirement for any
reconciliation to take place. Rather the decision of what must be done must be taken by the
people, with the interests of the whole nation in mind. It is an elected, majority government,
together with all other parties, joining together to develop a constitution that will have to
decide what kind of transitional justice to follow. In societies willing to move forwards,
knowing the truth might be enough and the acknowledgement of the offences by the
wrongdoers might be conclusive for social justice to take place. It is here that justice becomes
'contingent and particular'. According to Lenta (2000) "rules must be followed, but they are
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too general to provide justiCe, which is contingent and particular" (2000: 73). This will require
judges empowered to interpret and capable of interpreting every specific case in the light of
the constitution. If
in order to come to a just decision, the judge, for example, must not
only follow a rule of law or a particular law relevant to this case, but
must also assume it, approve it, confirm its value, by a reinstituting act
of interpretation, as if nothing previously existed of the law, as if the
judge himself invented the law in every case, ... each decision is
different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation (Derrida
1992a: 23, in Lenta 2000: 73)
The constitution, which will ensure the rule of law in the new democracy, is the key
element in the final step of the preparation for the transitional regime. Without agreement
from all sides upon this constitution, which will guarantee the protection of every individual
regardless of his or her political affiliation, the transition is unlikely to happen and if it does,
there is no guarantee of its sustainability. It is here that the words of Judge Mohammed can
find their place:
For a successfully negotiated transition, the terms of the transition
required not only the agreement of those victimized by abuse but also
those threatened by the transition to a 'democratic society based on
freedom and equality' (from the Constitution). If the Constitution kept
alive the prospect of continuous retaliation and revenge, the agreement
of those threatened by its implementation might never have been
forthcoming. (Quoted in Tutu 1999: 26)
Judge Mohammed was of course talking about the South African case, but this can also apply
to Rwanda. If any side still feels threatened by any forthcoming institution, it will be reluctant
to agree to its implementation, and may well ,be vigorously opposed to it. Once all these
prerequisites are met, a transitional regime can be established through democratic elections,
and the first task of this new regime will be to institute an organ that will deal with the
question of transitional justice.
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Conclusion
A conclusion to this dissertation could give the impression that the solution to the question
of how to deal with the situation in post-1994 Rwanda has been found. It must be emphasised
that though international organisations like UN have a role to play, without the full
participation of all the different parties involved in the conflict, there is no hope that any
solution is going to last. My conviction is that the conflicting parties within Rwanda itself are
the key holders for any attempt to find a sustainable solution.
I have focused on the specific case of post-genocide Rwanda with regard to transitional
justice. Transitional justice is understood as a kind of justice that has to deal, in the new
democracy, with human rights violations of the past. Because Rwanda is a specific case of
genocide, our first concern has been to understand this genocide and see to what extent it has
deformed Rwandans' relationships with each other.
The three different sources we have considered indicated that conflicts between Hutu and
Tutsi are not of yesterday, but are not as old as these groups in conflicts either. Even though
the Tutsi succeeded in subjugating the Hutu long before, relationships between them suffered
dramatically in the nineteenth century when-according to Mamdani-King Rwabugiri
reformed society so as to emphasise Hutuffutsi difference. At this stage there were still
possibilities of intermarriage and of changing from one group to another. The Belgian colonial
authorities finalized and rigidified the difference, thus putting an end to any movement
between the Hutu and Tutsi groups. Believing in their superiority and civilization, the
Belgians then defined Tutsi as a foreign race that took up residence within Rwanda to civilize
the indigenous Hutu. The problem of citizenship was thus created for the first time in the
history of Rwanda. When the UN wanted its Trust Territories to become independent,
Belgians began to support the oppressed side, the Hutu, introducing the first strong and
permanent difference between majority and minority. From this point the fusion of the
concepts of ethnic majority and political majority took place. When the majority Hutu group
came into power, a similar mistake was made and Tutsi had to suffer what Hutu had
previously suffered. This discrimination against Tutsi led those who had not fled the country
during and after the 1959 Revolution and who could not endure the situation inside Rwanda to
join others in exile.
The Second Republic of Habyalimana did a little better, by deracialising Tutsi identity
and conceding that they too were an indigenous people; the problem of exiled Tutsi remained.
Wanting to end the problem of their refugee status in Uganda, the exiled Tutsi organized
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tbemselvesinto an anned group-the RPF-and came back to their home country to reclaim
their citizenship and their lost power. The bloody civil war, which cost so many lives, started
on the 1st October 1990 and when Habyalimana was assassinated, there followed the 1994
genocide. This genocide however, far from being an end to civil war, has spread and
overflowed the borders of Rwanda. Human rights violations have been since then a recurring
phenomenon in the region of Great Lakes. Genocide spread from Rwanda into the DRC, since
Tutsi from inside Rwanda felt responsible for the survival of their relatives. Since then, the
armed struggle has not ceased.
Taking into account current conflicting information about Rwanda and all the parties
involved in the conflict, can one not question the events and ask whether Rwandans are not
being victimized and manipulated again, so that they will suffer the consequences later? Were
not the 1994 human rights violations the result of an old conflict that lingered on throughout
history?
The next question is: is Rwanda being victimized again by the UN? The first victimization of
Rwandan people by the UN occurred during colonialism when the Belgians implemented
policies that defined the Tutsi as aliens and gave 'indigenous' status to the Hutu. Tutsi and
Hutu existed in Rwanda before the arrival of colonialism but both considered themselves as
indigenous. While the Hutu were victimised by being considered as inferior though
indigenous, the Tutsi were defined as immigrants in their own country. Even though the Tutsi
first benefited from these divisive policies of racialisation, they suffered soon after because of
the same policies.
With the events of 1994, this phenomenon of racialism risks repeating itself. Whereas
racialisation first benefited the Tutsi, now those in power remind citizens of past genocide,
and themselves condone present-day killings, which must in the long run lead to retribution by
the opposing group. As no one knew that racialisation and indigenisation would one day give
birth to the horrifying massacres of 1994, we cannot know what will present-day killings
result in. The word 'genocide' carries a great weight of meaning and if the events which have
been labeled in this way are not scrutinised and their perpetrators punished, the retribution
which follows may be even more serious than if the events of 1994 were called otherwise.
Perhaps they were worthy of being so called. But what if it was a misconception or a
misjudgment that has led to exaggeration? Mistake or no mistake, history has taken shape
because that term has been used. The challenge is to know how to deal with the consequences
before it is too late. "Is it possible for people who have been engaged as enemies in a
protracted civil war and who have used all kinds of violence against one another to co-operate
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in a democratic fashion? Can they implement and maintain the democratic institutions that
Nielsen mentions?" (H.P.P Latter 1993: 131).
To say that this is not possible would be to neglect the fact that problems as well as answers
are all made by people. The will is all that is needed for change. In the case of Rwanda, the
authors of the problems may already be dead, but those who have inherited these problems are
also capable of finding a solution to the conflict they have inherited.
When it comes to the question of transitional justice in Rwanda, I have argued that
Rwanda is not yet a transitional regime, because transition supposes that progress towards
democracy, and not only is the actual Rwandan regime not democratic but it is opposed to
democracy. I have argued that transition may lie ahead, but this requires some preconditions
that the Rwandan people will have to first fulfil!. These preconditions include an end to any
armed struggle; facing the truth of genocide and its consequences; being honest with oneself,
with history and with one another; changing the ideology that has fused politics with ethnicity,
and ceasing to believe that political majority equals ethnic majority; sitting together and
working out a constitution that would ensure the rule of law in the new democratic regime;
and establishing a judicial system to deal with transitional justice adequately. Once all these
requirements, along with others, are met, a transitional regime may be brought about through
democratic elections.
Mamdani's proposition that the identities of Hutu and Tutsi should be dissolved in a crucible
of the larger Banyarwanda identity (Mamdani 2001: 281) does not seem to be a good solution.
To be a Munyarwanda (the singular of Banyarwanda) does not exclude the possibility of
remaining Tutsi or Hutu or even Twa, a third ethnic group in Rwanda. Mamdani's idea is that
because the crisis of Rwanda is a political crisis, the solution has to start by political reform.
Dissolving Hutu and Tutsi identities in one Banyarwanda identity is understood as essential to
national political reform, which needs support from both regional and international
communities. This is to say that while regional and international communities are granting
their help to Rwandans for national political reform, Rwandans have to re-imagine
themselves, to reinvent themselves, not as different groups, but as citizens of one country.
This is the idea of classical liberal democracy, where people of one country have to think of
themselves less as members of cultural entities· such as ethnic groups, and more as citizens.
Liberal democracy, a form of representative democracy or an indirect form of majority rule,
rests on the basis of traditional values of civil and natural rights (Robertson, D. 1984, 1993).
These rights, pointed out by Immanuel Kant as a priori freedom, equality between rational
beings, independence as citizens, constitute the basis of modem society (Schwarzmantel, J.
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1998) and present a dilemma in the modernising political community. What should be the
relationships between citizens of the "political community [which is] seen as an association of
rational citizens, deliberating together and each forming their plan of life within the
framework of the neutral state"? (Ibid: 84) Eatwell (1993) claims that "the state, like society
as a whole, came to be seen as a voluntary association held together by mutual consent of its
members". (Eatwell R. and Wright A. 1993: 27) Is this mutual consent enough to solve the
dilemma between the rights of citizens as members of an association of rational beings and the
rights of citizens as individuals planning their lives privately? Not wanting to go deeper into
this discussion, Mamdani says that to avoid more disaster, the minority must not monopolize
power. This is also what Ray (1995) believes: "In states where governmental power is
exercised autocratically, struggles for control of the government are likely to be more
desperate and violent. If the struggles pit ethnic groups against each other, massive violence
between them is a logical outcome [and] democratic governance is one logical solution to the
ethnic conflict"(Ray 1995: 119-21). If the democratic solution is adopted, minorities' interests
will be accommodated rather than forcibly subordinated or incorporated (Ibid.). This means
that Ray (and I am in agreement with him) is advocating political pluralism, which does not
have to undermine the moral pluralism of a multiplicity of ethnical values (Heywood 1992,
1998), in the way Mamdani's proposition would suppose. If the mainstream of national
political reform moves towards political democratic pluralism, this idea of Banyarwanda
identity would be an irrelevance, that, if it ever happened, might or might not occur within the
same political framework. Mamdani believes that if a transethnic identity is found to eradicate
all ethnic differences, it could help Hutu and Tutsi to forget their differences and emerge into
the political arena. But this can also be achieved without undermining or forgetting these
differences.
Rather than wanting to dissolve and forget Hutu and Tutsi identities, the challenge is to
accept those identities, but go beyond the barrier that they have so far imposed. This is to say
that being a Tutsi does not have to mean that one is an enemy of Hutu or vice versa. In a
democratic society towards which the transitional regime would lead, dissolving different
identities into one single Banyarwanda identity in order to solve ethnic conflict might involve
an artificial homogenisation similar to that of destroying political differences. Anyone who
believes that the solution to conflict between those who differ lies in the reduction of their
differences to uniformity rather than their uniting in their diversity is likely to commit the
same mistake in politics. To reduce political parties with different or even opposing ideas to
one single political party would be to change multiparty democracy into a one-party regime.
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With a one-party regime, democratic competition is no longer possible because there is only
one competitor. This will not solve the problem, because the single Banyarwanda identity will
ignore the particularities of loyalties which nevertheless continue to exist (Hutu, Tutsi and
Twa) and sooner or later those particularities will reclaim recognition. The solution therefore,
is to make all those different groups understand that harmony is possible in difference and that
being different does not necessarily mean being enemies or opposing one another. Diversity,
rather than being a barrier, is richness for those who want to develop further, because it is a
chance offered to them to complete one another. All the different ethnic groups will learn to
be themselves in associating with other different ethnic groups, first in politics and later in
other areas of social life. This is what I have called moving from ethnical affiliation to
political 'affiliation, or the creation of a transethnic political identity. It is a crucial challenge
and the only likely guarantee for sustainable relationships amongst Rwandans.
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